^[1] Volume 7, No 11/12, 2000, pp. 177-208.

^[2] Note that though these are areas of importance, they reflect de Quincey's particular interests more than they do the only places, within consciousness studies and philosophy of mind, where Wilber has made important contributions.

^[3] De Quincey's curious decision to focus on one of Wilber's many books as somehow representative of Wilber's entire body of work may be an important clue to the lack of perspective, balance, and fairness that characterizes so much of de Quincey's approach to Wilber's work. In fact, de Quincey's approach even prevents him, as we will see, from engaging this one book fairly and accurately.

^[4] I have learned a lot from de Quincey on the topics of intersubjectivity and Whitehead and look forward to learning even more as we continue to offer different perspectives. I take a strong stance against de Quincey in this essay (due to his misrepresentation of Wilber), but that in no way invalidates my indebtedness to him.

^[5] The full title of each book can be found in the Bibliography.

^[6] Most of these articles are listed on Frank Visser's website: www.worldofkenwilber.com

^[7] For example, see the introduction to the Collected Works volume 6 and "On Critics, Integral Institute, My Recent Writings, and Other Matters of Little Consequence: A Shambhala Interview with Ken Wilber," At http://wilber.shambhala.com .

^[8] We do not know which critics de Quincey has in mind, because he declines to name names or provide references.

^[9] See The Eye of Spirit p. 350 for Wilber's exact position.

^[10] Sanders goes on to make an interesting case for ways that Whitehead might have touched the divine along the lines of, as de Quincey suggests, jana yoga.

^[11] "Consciousness: Truth or Wisdom," Noetic Sciences Review. Issue 51, March-June 2000.

^[12] With regards to feelings-1 it is important to realize that different theorists will often emphasize different levels (or combinations) as being the location of feelings. By looking at Wilber's basic structures listed in the charts of Integral Psychology, one can see that the general level of emotions can be subdivided into "sensation," "perception," "impulse/emotion," and "endocept." All of these levels are associated with the vague concept "feelings." Of course each of these basic structures transcends and includes the others holarchically. With regards to feelings-2 it is important to realize that psychological development (at each wave) creates new spaces where more complex feelings can emerge (e.g., pain, rage, anger, hate or pleasure, satisfaction, liking, belongingness, compassion, altruism, rapture, love-bliss, infinite freedom-release, one taste). All to often writers such as de Quincey are very unclear about how they are defining "feelings" and this leads to much confusion.

^[13] For example, de Quincey misconstrues the three ways Wilber uses "body" and, as a result, completely misrepresents Wilber's position on the body-mind problem.

^[14] See the Collected Works volume 6 p. 544 for one of many places Wilber makes this distinction.

^[15] Consult Wilber's AQAL diagram, which makes clear the holarchical relationships in the Kosmos.

^[16] See the August 12^th entry in One Taste for yet another place that Wilber discusses issues of body/mind.

^[17] In Tony Schwartz's (1995) interview with Wilber, Wilber is very up front about his approach to consciousness being one that is predominately intellectual and grounded in cognition. This is his strength, but it doesn't mean that he doesn't honor feelings and emotions.

^[18] According to Wilber, current research suggests that the cognitive line is necessary but not sufficient (NBNS) for the interpersonal line which is NBNS for moral-sense which is NBNS for the idea of the Good (personal communication). Even though books like Greenspan's (1997) The Growth of the Mind explore the critical role affect has on early cognitive development, it appears that at a young age, cognitive development begins to lead emotions, though they can stay in a recursive relationship throughout development (in ideal development).

^[19] Examples include E. Neumann, J. Jaynes, J. Gebser, H. Chaudhuri, Aurobindo, J. Baldwin, N. Berdyaev, A. Maslow, R. Assagioli, G. W. Hegel, R. McDermot, and R. Steiner .

^[20] See the Collected Works volume 6, pp. 469-475 for Wilber's discussion of the three types of Body/Nature in the context of regression for both ideological and therapeutic regression.

^[21] For example, consult the Collected Works, volume 3 pp. 348-352, p. 356; and volume 7 p. 55.

^[22] Consult Rothberg & Kelly (ed. 1998) for the interactions between Grof and Wilber that shed light on this issue along with Wilber's stance on the relationship between regression and transcendence.

^[23] A fuller explication of these dimensions of intersubjectivity is provide in my The Evolution of Intersubjectivity (forthcoming).

^[24] This quote comes from A Brief History of Everything (1996) p. 114.

^[25] Some of the other places Wilber discusses intersubjectivity-as-context include: CW Volume 4 p. 617 and p. 709; CW 6 pp. 568-69, pp. 576-84, pp. 680-82, and pp. 770 --775; CW 7 p. 237, p. 434, and p. 570-72; CW 8 p. 147, and p. 192.; IP p. 253, pp. 283-84. References for where Wilber discusses the other forms of intersubjectivity will be provided below.

^[26] Because this book was written before Wilber had conceived of the four-quadrants, The Lower Left and Lower Right dimensions aren't always delineated but it is clear from the context where the discussion is located.

^[27] De Quincey provides no reference to studies that support this claim. I believe such telepathy occurs but not without interpretation.

^[28] de Quincey is splitting philosophical hairs when he suggests that Wilber is "wavering" because in Integral Psychology he suggests that you need introspection in addition to interpretation to get at interiors. True this might be seen as a case of Wilber not being consistent but one only has to look at his discussion of intersubjectivity and interpretation on the whole to understand what he is meaning.

^[29] For an insightful discussion of "direct experience" versus "interpretation" and how they are the same thing, consult CW 6 pp. 276-284 and pp. 624-633.

^[30] Note that Whitehead's ontology prevents two subjects from interacting simultaneously. This is a major problem for Whiteheadians trying to talk about intersubjectivity.

^[31] Wilber (2000b) gives a similar example using a deer-human interaction pp. 132-33.

^[32] For example see CW 6 pp. 767-73.

^[33] Places Wilber discusses the non-reductive relationship between the signifer and the signfied include: CW 6 pp.276-281, pp. 559-60, p. 626, p.746.

^[34] For additional passages where Wilber discusses intersubjectivity-as-resonance (depth, interpretation, and worldspaces etc) consult CW 6 pp. 131-33, 401, 568-69, 626, 674, 680, 740-1, 775; CW 7 pp. 123-26, 154, 156, 237, 433-4; and TOE p. 167.

^[35] Conveniently, de Quincey overlooks page 253 where Wilber states: "See Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, 2^nd ed., chap. 14, note 17, for an extensive discussion of the fact that subjective intentionally arises within an intersubjective worldspace, and a critique of theories ignoring this."

^[36] It should be noted that despite how helpful and complex Whitehead's cosmology is, its uses for intersubjectivity are limited in important ways. A few examples have already been noted in this paper, but for a fuller exploration consult my paper "Integrating Whitehead."