Below are all the references cited by de Quincey in footnote 14 (JCS p. 189) and a summary of each passage (including direct quotes). I find it difficult to see how most, let alone all, of these quotes support de Quincey's position. Even when the passage points to language or a community that uses language I don't see how it can be interpreted as being all about "linguistic exchange." The only way I can see making that case is to reduce every moment of intersubjectivity that involves humans speaking to each other as just consisting of the exchange of linguistic tokens (i.e., reducing everything to the Lower Right Hand correlate). But as de Quincey acknowledges, in footnote 13 (JCS p. 188), even when intersubjective contact is made through language, meaning and understanding are shared through an "interior-to-interior engagement" (i.e., Wilber's "a feel from within" or "harmonic resonate of depth"). Thus, even when Wilber provides examples or passages that involve communication through language, we can't reduce it to the exchange of linguistic tokens, especially given the many passages quoted and cited above that demonstrate Wilber's commitment to what de Quincey calls "interior-to-interior engagement."

So let's take a look at Integral Psychology:

On page 73 Wilber explains how each domain (e.g., "intersubjective or cultural,") has its own approach to truth (e.g., "morals").

On page 77 Wilber explains that each approach to consciousness (e.g., "second-person (lower Left)") has to engage every level of the Kosmos (i.e., the intersubjectivity of body, the intersubjectivity of mind, the intersubjectivity of soul, and the intersubjectivity of spirit).

On page 114 Wilber makes clear how different psycho-spiritual practices engage different domains and that an integral approach to life would draw on practices that address each domain. Examples he gives of practices for the Lower Left are: "Relationships -- with family, friends, sentient beings in general; making relationships part of one's growth, decentering the self; Community Service -- volunteer work, homeless shelters, hospice, etc.; Morals -- engaging the intersubjective world of the Good, practicing compassion in relation to all sentient beings."

On page 119 Wilber explains that "subjective experiences arise in the space created by intersubjective structures...".

On page 122 Wilber discloses that streams of development emphasize different spheres (i.e., subjective, objective, and intersubjective) and gives three examples of streams that emphasize intersubjective components: "worldviews, linguistics, ethics."

On page 145 Wilber discusses collective evolution and states that the intersubjective dimension includes "collective worldviews, ethics, values, and meaning."

On page 161 Wilber talks about how interpretation is the only way we can access interiority and he provides an example between a dog and its owner.

On page 183 Wilber mentions, in passing, "intersubjective backgrounds."

On page 186 Wilber points out again that both "first-person realties" and "third-person mechanisms" take place in "second-person intermediaries."

On page 192 Wilber describes an integral approach to consciousness studies that recognizes that any second-person communication (i.e., linguistic exchange) about consciousness is already set in intersubjective space (e.g., linguistic structures, worldviews, and background contexts).

Now we enter the footnotes.

On page 254 Wilber states that spirituality involves "intersubjective sharing" of phenomenological experience (i.e. "forms in consciousness") as it appears in morals, ethics, sangha, and discourse but these cannot be reduced to "moral injunctions."^[35]

On page 255 Wilber explains how phase four of his model includes the four quadrants (including the intersubjective/cultural domain).

On page 278 Wilber discusses Whitehead's prehension and how "it is not merely that a subject prehends its objects. Rather, intersubjectivity is the space in which the subject prehends its objects. The We is intrinsically part of the I, not as objective prehensions, but as subjective constitutive elements."

On page 283 after stating that all three modes of consciousness (I, we, and it) evolve, Wilber states: "Of course, both first-person and third person consciousness exist interrelated with networks of second-person, intersubjective structures, and these, too grow and develop." Then Wilber goes on to talk about integral psychology and how it follows the self's growth in all three domains including: "its relation to the intersubjective world of symbolic interaction, dialectical discourse, mutual understanding, normative structures, etc."

On page 284 Wilber talks about the most influential schools of developmental psychology including "symbolic interactionist" for the intersubjective domain.

On page 286 Wilber explores the limits of phenomenology "for its incapacity to comprehend intersubjective structures not given in the immediacy of felt bodily meaning, and thus its incapacity to deal effectively with the development of consciousness and the social world." Wilber goes on to say that "namely, an immediate introspection that, as useful as it is, does not spot any of the intersubjective structures in which subjective introspection occurs..." Then he points out that this is the problem with Whitehead's prehension which also occurs in the philosophy of consciousness.

On page 288 Wilber turns his attention to developmental lines in each quadrant and for the Lower Left he includes: "worldviews, intersubjective linguistic semantics, cultural values and mores, background cultural contexts, etc."

Now it is not at all easy or natural for me to see how the preceding quotes demonstrate that Wilber couches his discussion in terms of communities engaged in "linguistic exchange." Clearly many of the examples of the Lower Left quadrant have language as a correlate, such as ethics, worldviews, values, and meaning, but Wilber is invoking the Lower Left dimensions of such areas. Even de Quincey acknowledges: "Wilber does emphasize that a central function of the Lower Left 'intersubjective' cultural quadrant is meaning." Why then is de Quincey incapable of approaching the above passages from the starting point of meaning, since he knows that this is Wilber's starting point for the Lower Left? Yes, many of these passages are about communities, who do engage in "linguistic exchange." But to reduce each passage to being solely about linguistic exchange is to ignore the meaning of the passages themselves, not to mention the rest of Wilber's Phase IV writings (around 2650 pages), which must be drawn on if we are to accurately assess the meaning of what he's explaining. So is it fair for de Quincey to say, "[Wilber] knows that LL signifiers cannot be reduced to exchanges of LR signifieds. But he does not talk, or write, that way most of the time" (JCS p. 189)? No, it is not fair at all, nor is it accurate; yet this is precisely what de Quincey does when reading Wilber.

For de Quincey, the Integral Psychology passages above serve as a triumphant victory showing once and for all that Wilber does reduce intersubjectivity to linguistic tokens (LR exchanges). I must say that there is a big difference between reducing intersubjectivity to linguistic tokens and couching it in terms of communities engaged in linguistic exchange, neither of which Wilber does when you examine his entire corpus. By claiming that Wilber only deals with the exterior dimension of intersubjectivity, de Quincy wants to have his philosophical cake and eat it too. He states that his approach to intersubjectivity, which at this point he defines as "non-physically-mediated meaning," doesn't "preclude physical correlates." He goes on to agree with Wilber that "every interior has (must have) a corresponding exterior" (JCS p. 189). It strikes me as strange that de Quincey can have physical correlates to his intersubjectivity while basically denying Wilber that stance.

The problem here is that Wilber explores both the interior and exterior correlates of intersubjectivity while de Quincey over-emphasizes the interior correlates as a reaction to the current state of the field of philosophy of mind. Consequently, de Quincey is exterior-phobic, and the very fact that Wilber employs the terms "dialogue," "talk," and "interpretation" (forget the fact that Wilber uses these in a post-Cartesian context) he is immediately convicted of reducing intersubjectivity to the exchange of linguistic tokens. De Quincey suggests that Wilber should "shift his emphasis from language to presence (or interiority) when talking about intersubjectivity" (JCS p. 189). I have shown that Wilber not only emphasizes presence and interiority (e.g., "empathic resonance," "harmonic resonance of depth") but that even his emphasis on language (dialogue, talk, and interpretation) is actually an emphasis on presence and interiority because it requires an interior-to-interior connection.

One of the problems with de Quincey's inability to see that Wilber doesn't confine intersubjectivity to Lower Right exchanges is that every time he comes across a passage that he acknowledges is non-reductive he says Wilber is being "ambiguous," "ironic," or "contradictory." If de Quincey took the time to notice the variety of contexts that Wilber is speaking from, he would see that Wilber is being anything but contradictory in his articulation of intersubjectivity. Wilber seems ambiguous insofar as he doesn't explicitly define the different dimensions of intersubjectivity. However, when we look closely at an example de Quincey gives of Wilber's ambiguity, we discover that Wilber isn't being ambiguous; rather, de Quincey has placed Habermas' words into Wilber's mouth and then misunderstood what Habermas was saying in the first place. De Quincy introduces his example by saying that Wilber's "ambiguous" position on intersubjectivity is "well summarized" in a footnote in SES. Note that de Quincey is once again taking a single passage (context) and trying to make it paradigmatic for Wilber's entire position. It is this kind of either/or totalizing thinking that gets de Quincey into trouble.

The passage in SES that de Quincey refers to demonstrates that Wilber recognizes the difference between signifieds and signifiers. De Quincey even says this is what we'd expect from Wilber. Then de Quincey claims that on the next page Wilber "slides away from this important distinction" and reduces signifieds to signifiers under the umbrella of "linguistically generated intersubjectivity." But Wilber is just noting the parallels between his and Habermas' analysis. Wilber states: "In Habermas, the Left-Hand and the Right-Hand appear, among other places, as the distinction between linguistically generated intersubjectivity (Left) and self-referentially closed systems (Right)" (SES p. 546). Yes, Wilber is equating signifieds with "linguistically generated intersubjectivity" and signifiers with "self-referentially closed systems," insofar as these are the parallel terms that Habermas uses to make the important distinction between the collective interior and exterior. Note that neither Wilber nor Habermas is equating "linguistically generated intersubjectivity" with signifiers (i.e. linguistic tokens). In other words, linguistically generated intersubjectivity is something different than Lower Right exchanges. De Quincey misses this point entirely when he states: "In one linguistic swoop, [Wilber] contradicts his earlier distinction by collapsing (left) intersubjectivity to 'linguistic generation,' which just a few sentences earlier he identified as 'Right." The plain fact is that Wilber never identified linguistically generated intersubjectivity as Right, though he did identify linguistic signifiers as Right. I realize that for de Quincey linguistically generated intersubjectivity and linguistic signifiers sound of the same ilk but for Wilber and Habermas they are as different as night and day. Once again we have an example of de Quincey projecting onto terms his own definitions, in an all-or-nothing approach.

Then de Quincey backs off stating: "Now, admittedly, he may mean by 'linguistic' the combination of both (exterior) signifiers and (internal) signifieds, and therefore that he does mean to include interiors when talking of 'linguistically generated intersubjectivity.' I don't doubt that he does" (JCS p. 189). This is very typical of de Quincey's punch-and-ask-questions-later approach. But Wilber isn't even using Habermas' "linguistically generated intersubjectivity" to refer to both the signified and the signifiers. It only refers to the signified (i.e., the interior). For Habermas, mutual understanding (shared meaning) is a product of shared speech-acts in a dominance free environment. In other words, Habermas is concerned with the Left Hand correlate of linguistic exchange and this is why he uses a phrase like "linguistically generated intersubjectivity" to refer to interior-to-interior shared meaning. Because de Quincey is exclusively focusing on non-linguistic forms of intersubjectivity (which are very important and under discussed) he is blind to appreciating when theorists like Wilber and Habermas are talking about "true" intersubjectivity. For as soon as they say anything that invokes "language" they are suspected of denying nonlinguistic forms of intersubjectivity and/or reducing everything to linguistic tokens.

Fearing that maybe "linguistically generated intersubjectivity" is to be thought of as a description of "true" intersubjectivity de Quincey explains that:

it is not the case that only via language can intersubjectivity occur, but that actually only via intersubjectivity can language carry and exchange meaning. In other words, intersubjectivity is not "linguistically generated,' it precedes language, and is its ground of being, its context of meaning. (JCS p. 189)

Wilber couldn't agree more, and I explicitly pointed this out to de Quincey, in writing (via email), while he was apparently working on his JCS article. Neither Habermas nor Wilber is saying spoken language is the only way intersubjectivity can occur (this exposes de Quincey's tendency to think either/or and to totalize). Though both of them would argue that linguistic structures are ontologically prior to linguistic exchange (which is de Quincey's second point in the passage above). Depending on what you mean by "language" you can either claim it creates intersubjectivity (linguistic structures) or that it takes place as a result of intersubjectivity (linguistic tokens). Contrary to de Quincey's position, there are forms of ontological intersubjectivity that are linguistically generated.

De Quincey cites yet another example of Wilber being ambiguous. Ironically, he quotes a passage that highlights that all experience is a context but those contexts can touch immediately. This is ironic because de Quincey refers to this passage, which supports Wilber's position that intersubjectivity is interpretation, as an example of "the foundational experience of intersubjectivity" (JCS p. 190). In fact de Quincey explains that "Here, Wilber has clearly expressed the profound intersubjectivity intrinsic to Whitehead's ontology (which, ironically, elsewhere Wilber denies)" (JCS p. 190).^[36] In typical fashion, de Quincey concludes that Wilber denies this form of intersubjectivity (which he actually discusses in many places, see above) because he talks about different forms in different contexts. Why de Quincey insists that this adds to the ambiguity of Wilber's position, instead of trying to see how these seemingly ambiguous (contradictory) passages actually cohere, is a mystery to me.

In order to prevent an interpretation of Whitehead's ontology from sliding into nondual evaporation, de Quincey cautions, "But there's another, more serious problem: if the defense of Wilber's position on intersubjectivity is based on the fact that as a whole his philosophy is 'nondual' then, actually, the defense evaporates" (JCS p. 190). What de Quincey is suggesting is that if Wilber is placing all his intersubjective eggs in the nondual basket, then there is nothing that sets the Lower Left quadrant apart. Since all four quadrants are equally Spirit, why have a LL? This reasoning assumes that just because you have reality conceptually divided into four quadrants reality couldn't be nondual. Here, de Quincey is forgetting that every phenomenon, according to the model, has four correlates. Therefore, there is really only one (i.e., a field) quadrant and that it is permeated with nondual Spirit. I don't see the logic in de Quincey's claim that "There would be nothing special about LL" given we are talking about relative versus absolute truths. In relative terms there would be lots of things special about the LL. In absolute terms, de Quincey is right, there would be nothing special about the LL.

At this point de Quincey asks a very confusing rhetorical question: "In what way would LL intersubjectivity differ from intersubjectivity in any of the other quadrants?," (JCS p. 190). It doesn't make sense to speak of intersubjectivity in the other quadrants unless you are speaking about the correlates. In answering his own question, on behalf of Wilber, de Quincey claims the Lower Left is set apart by cultural meaning derived from linguistic tokens. Thus, de Quincey concludes that this "One Taste" approach to intersubjectivity forces Wilber to take refuge in linguistic tokens. It is hard for me to see how Wilber's acknowledgement that ultimately all relationships are grounded in our shared dimension of Spirit forces him into the intersubjective corner of linguistic tokens.

On the contrary, what Wilber is saying is that there are many entry points into the occurrence of intersubjectivity. We can look at the ground of being where touching (intersubjectivity) is grounded in Spirit (i.e., nonduality), then we can examine the intersubjective structures, which unfold and evolve in time, then we can look at the degree of "mutual understanding" or empathic resonance between subjects within those structures, then we could examine the many types of relationships that occur between subjects (it-it, I-it, I-I), and we could even explore the phenomenological dimensions of intersubjectivity. These are some of the spaces of exploration that are opened up by Wilber's model.

Towards the end of the "Intersubjectivity" section de Quincey gets a little self-conscious and wants to affirm to the reader that "this is not an incidental or 'nit-picking' critique" (JCS p. 190). While it might not be nit-picking based on the interpretation that is propelling de Quincey's presentation, given that his interpretation is so ungrounded, it leaves his critique feeling rather hollow and forced. Consequently, it is hard to take serious such claims as "One quarter of Wilber's four quadrants is left void or vacant. His LL is not what he claims it to be, i.e., the locus of intersubjectivity" (JCS p. 190).

De Quincey acknowledges that he doesn't think Wilber has meant to leave his Lower Left quadrant empty but adds that this is exactly what has happened given that Wilber has drawn on social linguists (Mead and Habermas) to describe and explain intersubjectivity and as a result "has unwittingly inherited their covert (and not always so covert) materialism and linguistic behaviorism" (JCS p. 190). Before I highlight the many individuals that Wilber has in fact drawn on for his discourse on intersubjectivity. I want to make two points. First, to reduce the contribution of Mead and Habermas to materialism and linguistic behaviorism does violence to both of these theorists. Though there are ways that each of these theorists falls short in explaining intersubjectivity, neither can be thought of in these simplistic terms. Besides, de Quincey doesn't cite any sources for such a strong (mis)interpretation of these complex theorists. Second, this position contradicts de Quincey's earlier stance presented in his "Intersubjectivity" paper presented at the Tucson Consciousness Conference in 1998. For example de Quincey explains that:

Underlying the "intersubjective project"--common to theorists from Mead and Buber to Habermas--is a motivation to not only counteract the exaggerated subjectivist bias in philosophy of consciousness, but also to avoid swamping the individual in overwhelming social norms of the collective, thereby depriving the individualized person of his or her autonomy and spontaneity. (p. 15)

Here, according to de Quincey both Mead and Habermas are in the good company of Buber (whom de Quincey hails), all of whom are trying to steer a path between extreme subjectivism and collective determinism (e.g., linguistic behaviorism). Later, in the same paper, de Quincey comments on Habermas:

Habermas is concerned with the real-world speaking of language, to its impact on who we take ourselves to be, and on how we act in the world. He is hardly interested in the theory of language, but is emphatically concerned with the practice of language--with its performative function. Language engages speakers and hearers in such a way that both participate and risk themselves in communication. In the process, consciousness intersubjectivity creates and reveals itself. (p. 18)

That doesn't sound like materialism or linguistic behaviorism to me. These passages from de Quincey's earlier paper seem at odds with his current position. Nevertheless, we have another example of de Quincey demonstrating his intolerance of theorists (Mead and Habermas) who dare to associate language and intersubjectivity. After all, how could they be anything but materialistic linguistic behaviorists? Now I would like to turn my attention to de Quincey's claim that Wilber derives his position on intersubjectivity largely from Mead and Habermas.

In Sex, Ecology, Spirituality Wilber (1995) lists a number of sociologists who have studied culture and shared values, which constitute common worldviews as a way of understanding the LL. He lists Peter Berger, Mary Douglas, Michael Foucault, Jurgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, and Clifford Geertz and says: "the influence of these six theorists can be heavily felt through out this presentation" (p. 128). In A Brief History of Everything, Wilber (1996) discussing the sociologists who focus on the hermeneutic cultural sciences (which focus on the interior dimensions of "sympathetic resonance," "sharing," and "talking") and lists: Wilhelm Dilthey, Max Weber, Marin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Clifford Geertz, Mary Douglas, Karl-Otto Apel, Charles Taylor, and Thomos Kuhn (p. 95). Wilber also has drawn importantly on Gebser, Whitehead, Nietzsche, Piaget, Kolberg, Kegan, Schultz, Velmans, Husserl, Saussure, Derrida, and Emerson for explicating his position on the many domains and types of intersubjectivity. For de Quincey to claim that Wilber bases everything he has to say on intersubjectivity on Mead and Habermas is to fly in the face of any comprehensive reading of Wilber.

There is no doubt that Wilber could make use of Buber and Whitehead in ways he hasn't yet but even to offer only those two as the antidote to Mead and Habermas is to present a very narrow concept of intersubjectivity. For example Buber's approach doesn't speak to intersubjective structures, subject-object theory, intrapsyhic dynamics, the developmental achievements necessary for true I-thou relationships etc., all of which have important insights about types of intersubjectivity. Similarly, Whitehead's ontology is crippled by the fact that subjects can't prehend subjects as subjects (I-Thou), they only can prehend subjects as objects (I-It). How can that be true intersubjectivity? Also, as with Buber's approach, intersubjective structures can't be accounted for by Whitehead. As essential as Buber and Whitehead are to any discussion on intersubjectivity they both have major limits and only deal with a few of many of the forms of intersubjectivity.

Why not ask Wilber to draw more explicitly on theorists such as Atwood and Stolorow, Irigaray, Benjamin, Stern? Despite the many theorists that Wilber does draw on for his LL, there are others that could also be present in the discussion, or even those that he does utilize might have gifts yet to be recognized. What Wilber does is provide a framework for looking at intersubjectivity in a wholly new way. He opens up spaces of inquiry and that is his greatest service to intersubjectivity--he highlights the many ways we can understand intersubjectivity and doesn't privilege one form over another.

It is important to keep in mind that for the different forms of intersubjectivity, Wilber draws on different theorists and traditions. For example, for intersubjectivity-as-spirit Wilber draws on Vedanta, Fichte, Emerson, and Holderlin. For intersubjectivity-as-context Wilber draws on Structuralism and Post-Structuralism, Foucault, Derrida, Saussure, Heidegger, and Nietzsche. For intersubjectivity-as-resonance he draws on anthropology, sociology, evolutionary theory, Gebser, Elgin, Schultz, Aurobindo, and Habermas' discussion of worldviews. For intersubjectivity-as-relationships Wilber draws on developmental psychology, object-relations theory, Kegan, Habermas' communicative action, and Whitehead.

Towards the end of de Quincey's "Intersubjectivity" section he asserts that Wilber's model is weakest in the LL -- which we've seen isn't the case. Further, he attributes this to Wilber downplaying the ontological and epistemological significance of feelings, which we've seen, is not the whole picture since Wilber emphasizes the ontological and epistemological value of feelings. Then de Quincey states that feelings are central to understanding intersubjectivity. But I would add that depending on what dimension of intersubjectivity you're talking about, "feelings" plays a different role. For example if you're taking about intersubjective structures, feelings don't factor into the discussion. If your talking about a dog and a human sharing an emotional worldspace, that is different in important ways from two people overcoming their differences at a postconventional level of psychological development through worldcentric compassion. It is not enough to just champion "feelings" as the keystone to intersubjectivity. We need to explore a variety of variables including unpacking what we mean by "feelings."

As we have seen in grave detail, de Quincey not only grossly misrepresents Wilber's theoretical position on feelings but he attempts character assassination in the name of contextualizing. This bias in de Quincey opens up a tremendous space for him to miscast his intersubjective net getting it caught in a number of half-truths. I have painstakingly displayed; how de Quincey confuses Wilber's critique of ideological regression for his position on therapeutic regression; how he ignores the way Wilber defines key terms, preferring to project his own definitions onto Wilber's writings; how he overlooks, misquotes, and uncontextualizes important passages despite his claim to be familiar with all of Wilber's writings; how he holds to the Cartesian idea of direct experience sans interpretation; how his definitions of intersubjectivity are already to be found explicitly in Wilber's writings; how his notion of "true" intersubjectivity is very problematic; how he misinterprets over a dozen cited passages in Integral Psychology; how his charges against Wilber of being ambiguous and contradictory are a result of his own blinders; how Wilber reaches far beyond the narrow band of intersubjective thinkers that de Quincey assigns him; and how Whitehead's (and de Quincey's) approach to intersubjectivity is extremely valuable but not the final word (nor is Wilber's, but it has a lot more going for it).

Since de Quincey draws heavily on Whitehead let me summarize why I think Whitehead's ontology is incapable of providing an integral theory of intersubjectivity. Whitehead does realize that there is a field of relationships that inform all subjects; but he doesn't grasp, nor does de Quincey, that some of the most important relationships are outside the phenomenon of prehension (concrescence). In fact, concrescence takes place in the space created by these structures. So while de Quincey highlights an important way we are constitutively intersubjective, there remains more radical and fundamental ways in which not only are our experiences of the cosmos constitutively intersubjective but our very being is constitutively intersubjective before we even enter the space of universal concrescence. It isn't enough to be dialogical, as Whitehead clearly is in important ways. We need to be integral.

In concluding his "Intersubjectivity" section de Quincey isolates the "root problem" of Wilber's treatment of intersubjectivity as being his categorical rejection of the ontological significance of feelings. I have demonstrated at length the inaccuracy of this assertion, which arises from de Quincey confusing Wilber's use of the ontological categories of fundamental and significant. It should be clear that what de Quincey calls feelings are ontologically essential for Wilber! So if this is the root problem, de Quincey's own house of cards just suffered a windstorm.

De Quincey then comes full circle to his ad hominem position pointing out that what is curiously missing in Wilber's writings is a "felt relational component." However, I don't see how de Quincey's article demonstrates or models a "felt relational component." It seems to be abstractly philosophical, heady, and largely lacking concrete examples from the world to explain his more congested sentences. I'm not faulting de Quincey for lacking a felt relational component. Rather, I'm just drawing attention to what I take to be ironic and symbolic of de Quincey's tendency to fault Wilber for what he himself does. De Quincey supports his charge by pointing to some critics in other groups "(e.g., feminists, eco-systems theorists, spiritual practitioners)" (JCS p. 191) that have leveled this claim at Wilber. Yes, some individuals from those "camps" share de Quincey's sentiments, but that doesn't necessarily make his claims anymore valid and it avoids the issue, namely that Wilber charges those feminists, eco-systems theorists, and spiritual practitioners with several limiting confusions around intersubjectivity. I believe, along with many others, that these are solid critiques, which raise our understanding of how essential it is that we avoid the pitfall of reducing intersubjectivity to interobjectivity.

Right before de Quincey goes on to the rest of his article, which is as flawed as his treatment of intersubjectivity, he reaches out to Wilber and asks that he see him as "an ally in the project to put intersubjectivity on the radar screen" (JCS p. 190). How could Wilber see him in that light after he has completely misconstrued Wilber's stance on the subject (and attacked his character) -- and in the process created the space to declare his own suggestions, all of which are to be found in Wilber's writings, even if Wilber doesn't present them the way de Quincey would. This strikes me as an inauthentic gesture given that de Quincey hasn't even taken the time to familiarize himself with the complexity of Wilber's approach to intersubjectivity.

Throughout this essay I have tried to honor de Quincey's insights while at the same time exposing what I consider to be unsubstantiated claims concerning Wilber's model. In response to de Quincey's tenuous positions I have taken a very strong stance. I have been willing to match the level of academic aggressiveness I found contained in his article and I have tried not to overstep the tone set by him. De Quincey was so emphatic concerning his interpretation of Wilber that I feel justified in bringing an adamant voice to the discussion, especially in light of the many places de Quincey has demonstrated neglect and omission (as summarized in this conclusion).

In response to de Quincey's juxtaposition of the Taj Mahal and a house of cards as metaphors for representing Wilber's model, neither image seems apt. In step with the rest of his paper, de Quincey gives us two extreme positions and asks us to choose. There is no room for either a both/and or a third option. I see the model, based on Wilber's characterization of it himself, as an open dialectical system, organically changing as we begin to understand the complexity of the territory. To reduce Wilber's model to these two choices reveals de Quincey's a priori agenda to reduce Wilber ad absurdum. After all, for Wilber to claim that his model is the Taj Mahal seems dogmatic and presumptuous, thus we must conclude that the model is a house of cards, which is exactly what de Quincey needs us to believe if he is to be successful with his gross misrepresentation of Wilber and his model.

Instead of a huge marble building with no capacity to move in the wind or a paper house that gets completely tumbled in a breeze, what is needed is a clarifying framework that can hold simultaneously the many dimensions of intersubjectivity. I believe that Ken Wilber's "all-quadrant, all-level" ontological-epistemological model is such a framework. It provides an evolutionary/developmental continuum that can serve to clarify many of the misunderstandings that occur in discussions of intersubjectivity. De Quincy isolates a number of these confusions and offers three different definitions of intersubjectivity as a way of overcoming these impasses. De Quincey's work is an invaluable contribution to the field of intersubjectivity. His is the only work I'm aware of that begins to untangle the very web of confusions that I'm addressing in this paper. Nevertheless, I feel there are several more important distinctions that need to be made as well as an exploration of how these dimensions relate to each other (the interrelationships of intersubjectivities). Only then can a proper philosophy of intersubjectivity begin to coalesce. In my opinion these distinctions can only be accounted for by an evolutionary/developmental approach to intersubjectivity.

In fact, Wilber's entire integral agenda is in part the stated need for us to honor "The Big Three" (subjective, intersubjective, and objective domains of the Kosmos). Thus, arguably one could claim that Wilber actually elevates intersubjectivity to a place unequaled by most theorists who have dealt with it. I can think of no other metaphysical frameworks that have explicitly stated that intersubjectivity is one of three legs stabilizing the Kosmological stool. Wilber actually provides a system that not only recognizes the three types of intersubjectivity that de Quincey highlights but goes beyond those to offer five distinct dimensions, several of which have sub-dimensions. Again, de Quincey's position is based on a limited and selective reading of Wilber. Admittedly, Wilber hasn't unpacked these dimensions in his writings to date but that is a far cry from claiming that Wilber doesn't make intersubjectivity a major concern (or that he only deals with linguistic tokens!). Clearly, Wilber's "all-quadrant, all-level" model can give voice to the complexity of intersubjectivity far more comprehensively than any other contemporary approach, even if Wilber himself hasn't gone to great lengths to do it.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Keith Thompson, Jorge Ferrer, Sean Kelly, and Ken Wilber for helpful comments and conversations on earlier drafts of this manuscript