A Response to Christian de Quincey's 'The Promise of Integralism'

Part II: Terms of Estrangement
In the fourth section (Intersubjectivity) I will concentrate on exposing how what de Quincey offers as intersubjectivity is already contained in Wilber's writings/model. The fifth section (Interpretation or Direct Experience) focuses on one of the main misunderstandings of de Quincey, where he fails to see what Wilber means by terms like "interpretation" and that all direct experience is dialogical. In the sixth section (Comparing Definitions of Intersubjectivity) I juxtapose de Quincey's definitions with passages found in Wilber to illustrate that Wilber in fact does speak at length about what de Quincey calls psychological and ontological intersubjectivity.

De Quincey starts out his section on intersubjectivity by acknowledging that both he and Wilber agree that "Not only is [intersubjectivity] essential, it is fundamental" (JCS p. 185). Then de Quincy provides a quote from Wilber, which highlights that subjective experience takes place in the space created by "intersubjective structures" (i.e., intersubjectivity is ontologically prior to subjectivity). De Quincy then suggests that despite this initial agreement, when he takes a closer look at Wilber's writings he finds the discussion to be so weak as to render Wilber's Lower Left quadrant without content. This pronouncement of vacancy immediately ignores at least two facts. First, it ignores all the places throughout Wilber's writings where he discusses the importance of recognizing that intersubjectivity (as-context) is ontologically prior to subjectivity (not to mention his discussion of other forms of intersubjectivity such as resonance or relationship).^[25] Given de Quincey's commitment to this quality of intersubjectivity (as ontologically prior to subjectivity) it is hard to understand how he has overlooked all these places.

Second, it ignores Up From Eden, a whole book of Wilber's devoted to cultural worldviews (which for Wilber are representative of the Lower Left quadrant).^[26] Though the concept of worldview doesn't cover all the important qualities of what can be called intersubjectivity, it surely covers many, and more than just linguistic exchange. It should also be noted that, starting with Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, Wilber complexifies his understanding of worldviews to include the intersubjectivity of non-human holons (which he generally refers to as worldspaces). Thus, to claim that the Lower Left is empty, as de Quincey does, immediately suggests a slanted agenda. As this suspicion bears itself out, it will appear that it is de Quincey's reading of Wilber that has left the Lower Left empty, and not Wilber.

We can begin to see the pitfalls of de Quincey's casual acquaintance with Wilber's writings when he says "In IP, [Wilber] gives a very clear account of his understanding of intersubjectivity," (JCS p. 185) and then de Quincey gives a quote from Wilber that highlights the dialogical dimension (intersubjectivity-as-relationship-as-difference). Yes, this is a fair representation of Wilber's account of intersubjectivity in this context, but de Quincey fails to qualify it as such and declares that it is only this context that Wilber is concerned with. After all, de Quincey takes this quote from a section in Wilber's writings entitled "Interpretation: The Heart of the Postmodern," which suggests that any discussion of intersubjectivity therein is going to highlight language -- since postmodernism places so much emphasis on language. So what we get is not Wilber's clear account on intersubjectivity writ large, but rather a clear account of what de Quincey takes for Wilber's stance. As we will see, there is little room to conclude, with a closer reading of Wilber, that this is his only stance. Rather, it is one of many.

De Quincey misappropriates the above quote when he ignores the next sentence of the quote he cites, where Wilber clarifies that:

In A Brief History of Everything, Wilber (1996) gives another example that highlights his emphasize on interpretation as resonance:

Since a dog doesn't exchange linguistic tokens (aside from some growls, barks, etc.) it is clear that Wilber's use of the concept of dialogue (i.e., "linguistic exchange") can't be reduced to simply the "exchange of linguistic tokens" as de Quincey suggests. So when Wilber uses the term "mutual understanding" he is not referring to agreeing on some objective fact (or even a subjective value). Rather he sees mutual understanding as a hermeneutic tool in which to interpret another subject's worldspace. In SES Wilber (CW 6) explains what he means by mutual understanding:

Interpretation or Direct Experience
There are two ways in which I think de Quincey goes wrong in his discussion of interpretation and direct experience. First, as discussed above, de Quincey's makes the mistake of reducing Wilber's notion of interpretation to dependency on the exchange of linguistic tokens. For example, he states: "the point is, according to Wilber's model, for meaning to be communicated or shared, it can do so 'only' by dialogue and interpretation, by 'talk' -- that is, by exchange of linguistic tokens, physical signals" (JCS p. 188). Second, de Quincey doesn't acknowledge that even his "direct immediate mutual apprehension between subjects" involves "interpretation." Thus, the reader is left with the sense that there is direct experience (unmediated connection) without interpretation (context). But that is a difficult position to support, given that contexts infuse our entire being and, as Wilber points out in his discussions of intersubjective-as-context, all direct experience (subjectivity) takes place in intersubjective structures. Even nonhuman holons have communication systems (i.e., forms of language) that exchange information, which in turn gets interpreted and responded to. As an example of "interior-to-interior participatory presence" de Quincey explains that as "we know from evidence for telepathy, shared meaning doesn't even require language (or any exchange of physical signals)" (JCS p. 188).^[27] However, as Wilber points out "Even if you were a great psychic and could totally read my mind, you would still have to figure out what my thoughts mean--you still have to interpret what you read" (BHE p. 91). So it is not as simple as having unmediated direct experience even if two subjects aren't exchanging linguistic tokens. Wilber (1995) explains:

So when de Quincey quotes Wilber as claiming that "the interior of a holon can only be accessed by interpretation" (JCS p. 186), de Quincey is correct but he doesn't grasp that Wilber's notion of interpretation is inclusive of what he calls "direct immediate mutual apprehension between subjects" (his definition 2a) and "co-creative nonphysical presence" (his definition 2b). Interpretation can be thought of in two ways. First, there is interpretation as one subject apprehending another subject via the physical body, emotional presence, sharing of meaning etc. And then there are the interpretive structures, in which those experiences take place, that result from a matrix of prior relationships. This problem of misunderstanding the relationship between interpretation and unmediated experience is confounded by the fact that de Quincey sets "true" intersubjectivity on an experiential foundation. This approach runs into trouble because, by choosing experiential as the common denominator, this allows de Quincey to couple a Cartesian definition (subjectivity is prior to intersubjectivity) with a post-Cartesian definition (intersubjectivity is prior to subjectivity). As a result there is an ontological tension lurking in his definition of true intersubjectivity under the guise of experiential meaning.

Another place where de Quincey misappropriates a quote to support his position occurs when he quotes The Eye of Spirit where Wilber states: "the only way you and I can get at each other's interiors is by dialogue and interpretation" (as quoted by de Quincey, JCS p. 186). Here de Quincey is drawing on Wilber's discussion of subjective truth claims in The Eye of Spirit where dialogue and interpretation (as Wilber uses the terms) is part of gauging sincerity, the hallmark of the Upper Left validity claim. De Quincey rips this out of its context (truthfulness between two subjects) and uses it to support his misinterpretations (Wilber's intersubjectivity is only two people speaking to each other). Had de Quincey just turned the page he would have encountered Wilber's discussion of the intersubjective validity claim where Wilber discusses "mutual understanding" and "mutual recognition." In fact Wilber is explicit that it isn't about agreeing on something (de Quincey's Cartesian intersubjectivity) but rather is about being able to recognize each other (in the sense of mutually experienced interiority) (ES pp. 16-17). Again we have "acts of mutual understanding" and "mutual recognition" and from the discussion above we know that mutual understanding is an "empathetic resonance," "harmonic resonance of depth," "a feel from within," a shared "lived experience" that subjects "intuitively feel into." All of these qualities are held up, understandably, by de Quincey as important parts of intersubjectivity. Yet he overlooks the many key passages where Wilber discusses them.

As a result of overlooking these passages, de Quincey accuses Wilber of subtle reductionism, pointing to a passage in SES where Wilber claims that you have to talk to someone to get at their interiors. For de Quincey this is subtle reductionism because he assumes that by "talking" Wilber just means the exchange of linguistic tokens. But in the next paragraph, Wilber explains that the process of dialogue is "dialogical or dialectical, or empathic in the broadest sense" (SES p. 134). Wilber goes on further to clarify, which de Quincey acknowledges but claims that it is a contradiction, that this process of studying interiors can only be done "empathetically, as a feel from within, and that means interpretation" (SES p. 134). It is very telling to look at how de Quincey examines these two paragraphs in SES. Instead of trying to understand how these apparently divergent positions (talking vs. empathic resonance) might be reconciled (i.e. realizing that talking is dialogical in the broadest sense) de Quincey opts for accusing Wilber of contradiction. This precludes him from seeing how Wilber's notion of interpretation involves what he calls "mutual apprehension" or the "sharing of presence."^[28]

After highlighting this seeming contradiction de Quincey succinctly states what he sees as Wilber's position on intersubjectivity. De Quincey goes so far as to say that "[Wilber] leaves us in no doubt what he means by 'intersubjectivity'"(JCS p. 186) when in actuality we are only left with no doubt about what de Quincey wants Wilber to mean by intersubjectivity. Thus de Quincey defines Wilber's intersubjectivity as "a subject-to-subject connection mediated by language and interpretation -- and 'only... by interpretation'. There is no unmediated, direct experience of the other" (JCS p. 186). Thus for de Quincey, Wilber fails because in his presentation of intersubjectivity "There is no unmediated, direct experience of the other," which we have seen is a gross misrepresentation of Wilber's actual position. De Quincey bases his argument on his definition of interpretation, which for de Quincey is:

Again, Wilber isn't denying direct unmediated experience between subjects, but his point is that that direct experience occurs in an intersubjective space such that there is no direct experience sans interpretation. For Wilber, "the world is not merely a perception but an interpretation" (IP p. 172). De Quincey seems overly committed to the Cartesian paradigm, given that his rhetoric suggests that there is direct experience (object) separate from interpretation (subject). This is in part evidenced in that de Quincey doesn't even discuss intersubjective structures. Presumedly his third definition is pointing in this direction but he doesn't explain in which ways or how we co-constitute each other out of a matrix of prior relationships. The only indication we get, in a much later section, is when de Quincey invokes Whitehead's notion that "each subject is constituted by its ancestral objects" (JCS p. 201).

However, we can think of what de Quincey calls "constitutively intersubjective" in three ways. First there is simply two subjects engaging each other and influencing one another. This is de Quincey's psychological intersubjectivity. Second there is a matrix of relationships (which I will call the secondary matrix), which influences a subject (via prehension) before that subject engages an object (that once was subject).^[30] This is de Quincey's ontological intersubjectivity, which is only ontological in the sense that the subjectivity is composed of prehensions (experienced relationships) before it engages another center of subjectivity. Third there is the primary matrix of relationships, which exists even prior to a subject's capacity to prehend the secondary matrix. Thus the primary matrix determines how the secondary matrix is prehended. This is Wilber's intersubjectivity-as-context.

So when de Quincey defends Whitehead's ontology and asks, "If each subject is constituted by every other subject, how much more intersubjective can you get?" (JCS p. 201) he again exposes his Cartesian tendencies. It is not enough to realize that subjects are in relationships and effected (co-created) by those relationships. You're still focused on individual subjects; you're just defining them with permeable boundaries. It is true that Whitehead, as de Quincey explains, recognizes that every subject arises only in intersubjective space through concrescence. Nevertheless, concrescence is a prehensive unification, where the constituting elements of each subject are the prior "expired subjects" (i.e., Whitehead's objects). What de Quincey fails to see is that because Whitehead's metaphysics is grounded in prehension (i.e., one subject experiencing another subject (as object)) it doesn't acknowledge those structures that aren't available to experience (prehension). Consequently, Wilber is "more intersubjective" on at least two counts. First he embraces the postmodern insight that there is a primary matrix which is inaccessible to prehensions (i.e., intersubjective structures). Secondly he acknowledges that ultimately intersubjectivity is only possible because we are the same Self.

Wilber wants to emphasize that interpretation is an intrinsic part of the Kosmos and that postmodernism has given us this insight. To claim that Wilber denies the occurrence of direct unmediated intersubjective relationships is going too far. What de Quincey is championing is very similar (if not identical) to what I call intersubjectivity-as-resonance: the more depth that two subjects share the more resonance they can experience (i.e., the more kinds of ways these two subjects can experience each other bereft of linguistic tokens). Wilber captures this quality of intersubjectivity when he states, "The agency of each holon establishes an opening or clearing in which similar-depthed holons can manifest to each other, for each other: agency-in-community (all the way down)" (SES p. 570).

This shared space where unmediated experience (i.e., no exchanging of linguistic tokens) takes place is what Wilber refers to as a worldspace. For example, according to Wilber, as we saw, a dog and I share an emotional worldspace thus we can have an unmediated experience of each other's emotional state. However, the dog and I don't share a conceptual worldspace, so when I'm thinking about GATT and the environment, my dog can't have a direct unmediated experience of that, even if I explain it in detail to her. In other words, for two subjects to share any kind of unmediated direct experience they have to share a common worldspace (physical, energetic, emotional etc.). Because humans share worldspaces with many things they can have direct unmediated experience with a wide range of subjects. Wilber (1996) gives the example of a wolf pack to illustrate this:

I encourage de Quincy to spell out why a notion of direct experience devoid of interpretation is important (let alone possible) to discussions of intersubjectivity. For me one of the most interesting aspects of intersubjectivity is the role of interpretation, for example, how we respond to direct experience and what direct experience can we respond to. As I sit here next to my dog, I can value the distinction regarding direct unmediated "felt" experience but to me the issue of intersubjectivity comes alive when I try and understand how it is that my dog and I can respond to (interpret) that direct experience of each other -- and this is where Wilber shines. There are moments in de Quincey's writings where I can see he intuits this, but his strong stance against interpretation makes it difficult for me to know exactly where he stands on these issues.

After suggesting that Wilber's emphasis on "interpretation" prevents him from being able to acknowledge the unmediated direct experience of the other, de Quincey offers up his definition of "true" intersubjectivity:

True intersubjectivity, as I understand it, is unmediated. It is direct subject-to-subject sharing of presence -- where both (or more) subjects either mutually condition each other's sense of self, or, more strongly mutually co-create each other's sense of self. (JCS p. 186)

My problems with this definition are threefold. First, calling this true intersubjectivity is problematic for five reasons. One, it implies that other dimensions of intersubjectivity (which aren't covered in de Quincey's definition) are "false" or somehow lesser forms of intersubjectivity, when in fact by "true" de Quincy just means what he considers to be the most important (i.e., what he chooses to privilege).

Two, this demarcation of "true" is hollow. It doesn't say anything, because the first definition is exposed as not even being intersubjective but rather interobjective. In effect it is like saying, everything that is not interobjective is intersubjective, or saying everything that is intersubjective is true intersubjectivity. It is more helpful when de Quincey uses the terms "Cartesian intersubjectivity," "psychological intersubjectivity," and "ontological intersubjectivity" to talk about intersubjectivity.

Three, as mentioned above, calling this definition true, when it is a combination of a Cartesian formulation (subjectivity is ontologically prior to intersubjectivity) and a post-Cartesian formula (intersubjectivity is ontologically prior to subjectivity) creates an internal contradiction, even if both are "experiential." The contradiction occurs because you can't have experience without a locus of subjectivity. Therefore subjectivity, though constituted through experiences (prehensions etc.) of relationships remains ontologically primary. In other words, de Quincey's emphasis on the experiential quality of intersubjectivity actually prevents him from having "true" ontological intersubjectivity. Recall that for intersubjectivity to be truly ontological to subjectivity it must constitute the subject (primary matrix) even before the subject can experience the myriad relationships (secondary matrix) that continue to influence (co-create) it.

Four, de Quincey does not justify adequately why experiential intersubjectivity is true and other forms of intersubjectivity which aren't experiential are not-true intersubjectivity. After all, one could claim that intersubjectivity-as-context (i.e. intersubjective structures) which is not experienced phenomenologically (or through prehension) is true intersubjectivity because it is ontologically prior to even the experiential forms of intersubjectivity which are grounded in relationship.^[32] In other words, there is a form of intersubjectivity, as I have shown, that even precedes what de Quincey calls ontological intersubjectivity -- because de Quincey focuses on the experiential component, while ignoring the structures those experiences take place in.

Five, there are also experiential sub-dimensions of intersubjectivity that could be fruitfully considered "true intersubjectivity." For example, someone could claim that intersubjectivity-as-relationship-as-difference (a la Habermas, Kegan or Irigaray) is true intersubjectivity because it is only with the developmental achievement of aperspectival thinking that people can truly be decentered enough to authentically understand another perspective that is not part of their own self-identity. Besides, there are other forms of intersubjectivity that de Quincey doesn't even acknowledge, including types of relationships, intrapsychic, interspecial, levels of being interacting etc. Though all of these still would fall under the rubric of "experiential intersubjectivity," if one claims that experiential is the line of demarcation, as de Quincy does, one ends up with a category (of true intersubjectivity) that is so general it is hardly helpful because it contains five or six sub types, any of which could also be argued to be "true" depending on the criteria embraced. Consequently, it is not clear how de Quincey justifies his notion of intersubjectivity as "true" other than by contrasting it with the outdated concept of Cartesian intersubjectivity which he unfairly assigns to Wilber. Ironically, de Quincey has one foot in the Cartesian door by focusing on a word like "true" to discuss intersubjectivity and because he focuses on the experience of individual subjects, opposed to really exploring how those experiences are shaped by non-experienced relationships.

The second problem I have with this definition is that it is not clear to me how we can talk about mutually conditioning each other's sense of self or even co-creating it without invoking what Wilber calls "interpretation." Maybe de Quincey is pointing to intersubjective structures though he never explicitly talks about them even in his strong version of intersubjectivity (despite the fact that he opens his section "Intersubjectivity" by agreeing with a passage of Wilber's that mentions intersubjective structures). I suspect that one of the reasons that de Quincey avoids discussing intersubjective structures is that they are not experiential. The reason for this is because these structures constitute the subject before it even interacts with another subject. In other words, these structures determine what can and can't be experienced. In moments de Quincey seems to invoke this understanding but it is soon overshadowed by his emphasis on two (or more) subjects interacting ("'I-to-I' communion"). Thus, his "direct subject-to-subject" interaction is still Cartesian even if the subjects co-create each other in the interaction, because they are still creating isolated subjectivities, even if those subjectivities are in relationship. To be post-Cartesian, they need to create each other before the interaction. De Quincey doesn't clearly make this distinction.

The third and last problem with the definition is that it seems limiting to suggest that one's sense of self is the end point for intersubjectivity either, by conditioning it (psychological intersubjectivity) or co-creating it (ontological intersubjectivity), which again exposes de Quincey's commitment to individual subjectivity. There are many other ways that intersubjectivity occurs beyond one's individual sense of self. Besides, do two dogs have a sense of self, do a bird and a worm, do two atoms etc.? A comprehensive account of intersubjectivity must not confine itself to a subject's "sense of self." Also, the way de Quincey seems to be using "sense of self" recapitulates the Cartesian emphasis on individual subjectivities, even while recognizing that they are in relationship. The focus still privileges the individual. It is possible that de Quincey means something like when Wilber recognizes that "When you feel your 'self,' you are actually feeling a circle of intersubjective events, and you exist in that cultural circle, you do not exist merely inside your skin" (CW 7 p. 237). Even though Wilber recognizes that one's individual subjectivity is actually spread across a matrix of relationships, he goes farther than de Quincey and claims that not only is one's "sense of self" co-created through interaction of subjects, but that the self is actually co-created by a matrix of relationships even before the subject's sense of self is co-created by subjects interacting. In a discussion of Whitehead, Wilber explains in Integral Psychology that "this part of intersubjectivity [intersubjectivity-as-context] is therefore not 'an object that once was subject" (p. 278). In other words, there is a dimension of intersubjectivity that acts as a background, which creates the subject(s) and is itself unavailable to that subject's awareness as experience.

After introducing this general definition of "true" intersubjectivity de Quincey gives three proper definitions of intersubjectivity. The last two comprising "true" intersubjectivity. However, de Quincey doesn't give us concrete examples of his three kinds of intersubjectivity, which leaves his discussion feeling very heady and lacking a felt-relational component, something he accuses Wilber of. After briefly explaining each definition I will demonstrate how it interfaces with Wilber's writings.

1a. Cartesian intersubjectivity (intersubjective agreement): This definition is characterized by the exchange of physical signals (written or spoken) that service agreement on "so-called objective" facts. The emphasis is on intersubjective agreement where language (the exchange of conceptual and linguistic tokens) is used to arrive at a shared world. Here individual subjectivity ontologically precedes intersubjectivity. This is clearly an old school definition grounded on a notion of "objectivity" that many would consider outdated. Not only does it provide no room for the agreement of subjective values, but seems to discount many physical signals (such as body language, chi, and pheromones).

Even though de Quincey assigns this definition to Wilber (despite the fact that he opens his section with a quote from Wilber that highlights intersubjectivity-as-context) the previous pages should show that this isn't Wilber's position. Besides, even when Wilber is talking about mutual understanding between two humans engaged in linguistic exchange, he is not being as reductive as this definition. So while Wilber wouldn't deny this definition, as a part of two subjects in relationship, he has been very critical of this kind of reduction.^[33]

2a. Psychological intersubjectivity (intersubjective participation): This definition is characterized by the direct, immediate mutual interaction between subjects and how their psychologies are affected and conditioned as a result of the engagement. This definition emphasizes the "experienced interiority" of two (or more) subjects as they interact and isn't confined to "objective" agreement as above. It is considered to be weak, as is the above version because the subject is still posited as ontologically prior to intersubjectivity. This form of intersubjectivity is concerned with "mutual engagement:" how our psychologies effect and are effected by those we interact with. Thus, psychological intersubjectivity is "direct immediate mutual apprehension between subjects." (JCS p. 187)

I have already provided a number of quotes that demonstrate that Wilber discusses in many places this form of intersubjectivity, which I call intersubjectivity-as-resonance.^[34] For Wilber, this dimension of intersubjectivity is characterized by "mutual understanding" which is available to all sentient beings, where "mutually shared experience [is] the coinage and mutual understanding the goal" (CW 6 p. 740). Elsewhere in SES Wilber explains that:

To reconstruct meaning (the Left-Hand path) I must engage in interpretation (hermeneutics); I must try to enter the shared depths, shared values, shared worldviews of the inhabitants; I must try to understand and describe the culture from within ... I cannot simply see meaning; meaning does not sit on the surface waiting, like a patch of color, to hit my senses. Rather to the extent that I can, I must resonate with the interior depth of the inhabitants. (CW 6 p. 133)

Clearly, Wilber speaks, at length, to de Quincey's "psychological intersubjectivity" of experienced interiority.

2b. Ontological intersubjectivity (intersubjective co-creativity): This definition is characterized by the prior network of relationships which serve as the ground out of which all subjects interact and co-arise. This is intersubjective co-creativity where ones experience of oneself is "qualitatively" different as a result of engaging with another center of experience (i.e. subject) and vice versa. This is de Quincey's "most radical meaning" and as such poses the biggest challenge to current approaches in the field of philosophy of mind. With eloquence, de Quincey calls this radical intersubjectivity "an 'interpenetrating' co-creation of loci of subjectivity--a thoroughly holistic and organismic mutuality" (JCS p. 188). Unfortunately, he never really unpacks this collection of buzzwords.

This definition is characterized by the idea that "All individual subjects co-emerge, or co-arise, out of a holistic 'field' of relationships" (JCS p. 187). Thus here we have a break with the Cartesian assumption that subjectivity is ontologically prior to intersubjectivity. It is indeed a radical break with hundreds of years of philosophy. A direct challenge to the Cartesian worldview, but de Quincey fails to mention that this insight is only half of the main insight of postmodernism. The first half is that the subject is embedded in a field of relationships and the second half is that both subjects and objects arise out of that field. De Quincey is good at mentioning the first half, and he is to be applauded for this, but until he equally emphasizes the second half of the post-Cartesian equation, he will remain tethered to a monological framework. Granted de Quincey talks about "mutual co-arising" which sounds like the second half but when he qualifies what he means he emphasizes "engagement" and "experience." He even explains that "experienced interiority is implicit throughout" (JCS p. 187), which implies that, for de Quincey, intersubjectivity (even in its radical form) always involves "experience." Thus, it appears that de Quincey never breaks away from the Cartesian definition of intersubjectivity.

As insightful as this definition sounds it suffers from de Quincey pointing out a post-Cartesian insight (we are constituted by many types of relationships) and then emphasizing a phenomenological (i.e., Cartesian) quality (my experience of myself is effected by other subjectivities). In other words, de Quincey points out how our subjective experiences take place in the space created by intersubjective structures (which results from a prior matrix of relationships) but he is still focused on the experience (psychological intersubjectivity) that takes place in that space and doesn't talk at all about the actual background structures or contexts. This is problematic because his presentation tends to suggest that subjects can experience intersubjective structures but they cannot. They are inaccessible via phenomenological inquiry. Wilber explains:

Even in concrescence, where a subject prehends and is constituted by its ancestoral objects these are only phenomenologically grasped objects (or intersubjects). Most of the important intersubjective structures are not phenomenological, are never prehended as objects, but exert their influence directly on the subject (since the subject is arising in the intersubjective field). Again, Whitehead handles part of the Cartesian problem but cannot handle the intersubjective field that is never a prehended object. (personal communication).

Thus, post-Cartesian intersubjectivity isn't dependent on me engaging with you, as de Quincey would have it. Instead, I'm created by you and others (via a shared background context) before we even engage. This is one of the many reasons that Wilber's approach to intersubjectivity is even more radical than de Quincey's. Not only does Wilber place at the center of the discussion both halves of the post-Cartesian formula (we are constituted by a matrix of relationships and we are constituted by a matrix of intersubjective structures) but he also explains that the reason a subject can know another subject is because there is only one Self (intersubjectivity-as-spirit). He explains:

The agency in a holon is ultimately pure Spirit. On the manifest side subjects are separated in space and time, there is no simultaneous co-presence (as Whitehead's ontology supports) and therefore no direct knowing because everything is separated by micro-seconds. True simultaneous co-presence is possible only through the radical subjectivity of One Taste, the glue that allows all intersubjectivity to manifest in space and time. (personal communication)

Consequently, de Quincey's use of Whitehead's "incomplete holarchy" doesn't go far enough for a criterion of ontological intersubjectivity. It falls short on two counts: intersubjectivity-as-context and intersubjectivity-as-spirit.

Because this third definition is de Quincey's keystone, I will provide several quotes from Wilber's writings that demonstrate that Wilber not only includes this type of intersubjectivity but that it is a hallmark of his discussion of intersubjectivity -- championing the postmodern insight of ontological intersubjectivity. For example in The Eye of Spirit, Wilber says:

One of the great discoveries of the postmodern West is that what we previously took to be an unproblematic consciousness reflecting on the world at large ("the mirror of nature") is in fact anchored in a network of nonobvious intersubjective structures (including linguistic, ethical, cultural, aesthetics, and syntactic structures). (CW 7 p. 570)

In Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, he explains:

Thus, as I earlier mentioned, a worldspace is not simply pregiven and then merely represented via a correspondence of agency with its allegedly separable communions (other agencies). Rather, the coherency of its agency (autonomy), structurally coupled with other communing agencies, enacts a worldspace mutually codetermined. (CW 6 p. 569)

Later in SES he states:

For [phenomenological] experiences do not unfold in pregiven subjective space; that subjective space exists only in, and by virtue of, an intersubjective space formed by a developmental process of mutual understanding and mutual recognition, which is the actual space or 'background' of the subjective experiences (i.e., it is the intersubjective space in which the experiences come and go), a background that does not itself enter awareness as an experience, and therefore cannot be found phenomenologically... (CW 6 p. 771).

And recall the quote de Quincey opened his "Intersubjectivity" section with:

Failing to see that subjective experiences arise in the space created by intersubjective structures is one of the main liabilities of many forms of spiritual and transpersonal psychology. (IP p. 119)

Obviously, Wilber recognizes "ontological intersubjectivity." This is not only evidenced by the many passages where he discusses it directly (see footnote 14 above) but also by his discussion and use of Heidegger's "interpretive ontology," Foucault's "archeology" and "genealogy," and Derrida's "grammatology." Wilber draws heavily on postmodernism and its claim that intersubjectivity is ontologically prior to subjectivity. Thus, de Quincey is mistaken when he concludes that in Wilber there is "certainly no room for one or more subjects dynamically, mutually creating each other's 'node' or nexus of subjectivity within the (universal) matrix of the ground of being of intersubjective relationships" (JCS p. 189). Though I think I understand what de Quincey is driving at here, it becomes difficult to really know what is being talked about when the time is not taken to clarify terms and unpack meanings. For example, a reader might not know if de Quincey is talking about intersubjective structures, psychologically influencing another subject through relationship, or the spiritual ground from which we all spring?

Though Wilber and de Quincey might articulate their discussion of intersubjectivity differently, with different emphasis, it is obvious that Wilber discusses in many places psychological intersubjectivity and in many places ontological intersubjectivity, as well as other dimensions of intersubjectivity that de Quincey doesn't even explore. There seems to be little room for de Quincey to claim:

Wilber's 'intersubjectivity' is not wrong; it's just very weak. It's what standard linguistic philosophy, social theory, and philosophy of science refer to as 'intersubjectivity' (and is really objectivity or interobjectivity [Velmans, 1993])... But as I point out and as Wilber emphasizes, such communication is mediated via exchanges of linguistic tokens, which are exteriors. In this kind of 'intersubjectivity' alone there is no direct interior-to-interior connection or sharing. (JCS p. 188)

In light of the discussion above, we can now begin to see just how off the mark de Quincey is when he states: "...according to Wilber's model, for meaning to be communicated or shared, it can do so 'only' by dialogue and interpretation, by 'talk'--that is, by exchange of linguistic tokens, physical signals" (JCS p. 188). We have seen that Wilber's use of the terms "dialogue," "interpretation," and "talk" is not confined to language, let alone linguistic tokens. For example, Wilber defines "talk" as empathic resonance and the dialogue is actually two interiors in relationship to one another (i.e., communicating, informing).

Ironically, de Quincey admits in a footnote that even with contact via language there is interior-to-interior connection or sharing; in fact he claims it is "the only way people can share meaning and understand each other." What de Quincey is saying is exactly what Wilber has been saying all along: mutual understanding (i.e. shared meaning) requires a "feel from within" (i.e., participatory presence) and a shared worldspace. It is obvious that de Quincey understands many of the key issues within intersubjectivity. He just refuses to see that Wilber does too, despite the occasional concession he gives Wilber.

De Quincey goes on to say that in Wilber's model there is no room for silent engaged presence (but we have seen that Wilber acknowledges subjects, human and non-human, sharing an emotional worldspace, as well as Spirit), no room for shared feelings (recall the example of the dog and owner or the wolf pack), no room for telepathic communion (recall Wilber's point that even telepathy requires interpretation), no room for true intersubjectivity -- as de Quincey defines it -- (consult the above passages that show Wilber speaks to both psychological and ontological intersubjectivity). Obviously, de Quincey is refusing to see Wilber's contribution in these areas -- even if he has a slightly different understanding. It is clear that Wilber speaks to all the areas de Quincey highlights as being missing. In the same issue of JCS as de Quincey's critique appears Wilber provides a concise statement about this issue:

Thus, in humans [recall that he talks about non-human intersubjectivity in both BHE and SES], intersubjectivity is not established merely by exchange of linguistic signifiers, which is the commonly accepted notion. Rather, humans contain pre-linguistic intersubjectivity (established by, e.g., emotional or prereflexive co-presence with and to the other); linguistic intersubjectivity (established by the co-presence of interiority whose exteriors are linguistic signifiers but cannot be reduced to those exteriors); and trans-linguistic intersubjectivity (established by the simple presence of Presence, or nondual Spirit). In short, intersubjectivity is established at all levels by an interior resonance of those elements present at each level, a resonance that appears to span the entire spectrum of consciousness, pre-linguistic to linguistic to Trans-linguistic. The suggestion that I limit intersubjectivity to the exchange of linguistic signifiers is quite off the mark (see Wilber, 1995). (JCS p. 164)

This summary brings together Wilber's comments on 1. The sharing of emotional and non-linguistic worldspaces (e.g. BHE p. 78-79, 99-100; CW 6 p. 132-33; IP p. 161); 2. The role of hermeneutics in exploring the creation of meaning via linguistic exchange (e.g., CW 6 pp. 133-34, 278-79, 570-72, 576-84, 705-10, 745-49; CW 7 p. 139-41); 3. The nondual ground of being that allows all relationships to occur via the simultaneous occurrence of Spirit in all holons (e.g., BHE p.114; SES p. 600-5, 606). By no means is the above statement a definitive account of Wilber's position. One only has to examine the many passages quoted and referenced in this paper to see an even more complex position. Nevertheless, the above passage serves to drive home the point that to claim Wilber's position on intersubjectivity is predominately concerned with the exchange of linguistic tokens is a gross misrepresentation.

After inaccurately explaining how flawed Wilber's treatment of intersubjectivity is de Quincey admits, "Wilber is clearly aware that LR exchanges by themselves cannot account for intersubjectivity (LL phenomena)" (JCS p. 189). Then de Quincy encourages us to look up any of 17 passages in Integral Psychology where we can see for ourselves that "almost all [of Wilber's] references to intersubjectivity are couched in terms of communities engaged in linguistic exchange" (JCS p. 189). Taking de Quincey up on his invitation to examine these 17 references I looked up each passage to try and understand why de Quincey was so insistent on his position.