I must say that I'm disappointed in de Quincey's treatment here. If he wants to bring attention to the psychology of the man and muse about how that effects the model, why just focus on the polemic? This approach seems like a dismissive tactic of psychologizing the model as a way of depriving it of legitimacy. Why not, in addition to the polemic, explore (or at least raise the issue) of how Wilber's gender, ethnicity, socio-economic status, the cultures he's been exposed to (and duration), spiritual practice (e.g., techniques, teachers, traditions), and life experiences etc. have effected the model. Those areas reveal much more interesting things about the context (fingerprints) that gave birth to the model (map). It is not at all clear how de Quincey's condemnation of Wilber's style is any different than the ad hominem style he states he wants to avoid. If de Quincey wishes to claim that we are bankrupt to divorce the man from the model, the point is well taken. But to only focus on one part of the man--and then to present it lopsidedly--causes de Quincey's argument to veer dangerously close to character assassination. There is an important difference between, on the one hand, drawing on relevant biographical or psychological information to deepen an understanding of an important theorist; and on the other hand, presuming to identify character flaws in the name of that process.

What is so disturbing to me is the extent to which de Quincey decontextualizes the polemic in the name of contexualizing the model. For example, de Quincey fails to acknowledge that Wilber's first eleven books (SoC, NB, AP, UE, EE, ToC, HP, SG, QQ, SC, GG) written over a period of eighteen years (1973-1991) are not polemical works.^[5] Nor does de Quincey, ostensibly familiar with Wilber's entire body of writings, mention that Wilber has also penned over a hundred polemic-free articles.^[6] Yes, there are some devastating critiques of various positions contained in those books and articles but it would not be fair to characterize Wilber's writing style as polemical until 1995, with the publication of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality (SES). So when de Quincey says (in footnote 7): "His [Wilber's] works are littered with cutting and often disparaging references to 'narcissistic' feelings, to Romantics who long to ride the 'Regress Express' to primitive emotional states, and to Eco-minded 'mushiness'..." (JCS p., 183), I find it very curious that he only sites SES to support his position. What about the eleven books before that? I will grant that A Brief History of Everything (BHE), The Eye of Spirit (ES) and parts of One Taste (OT) contain similar polemics, but to say "his works" in such a totalizing manner, without acknowledging the context, is simply misleading. Besides, Wilber has explained in several places that the first draft of SES didn't contain any polemic, and that he consciously chose to be polemical for well considered reasons. Also, Wilber has since gone back to SES and other books and redressed the polemic, taking out or watering it down (in response to feedback that it was too harsh).^[7] There is also the important issue of whether there is value or truth in what may be called (with apologies to Picasso) Wilber's brief Red Period.

Also, three of Wilber's latest books, The Marriage of Sense and Soul (MSS), Integral Psychology (IP), and A Theory of Everything (TOE) contain nothing that can be considered vitriolic or polemical. Ironically, IP and TOE are the two books that de Quincey is drawing on for his dubious "holographic" review ("Pick up almost any single volume and you can get information about the whole" JCS p. 182). I suspect it is this kind of laissez-faire relationship to Wilber's work that has allowed de Quincey to reach the kinds of half-baked conclusions he does. A scholarly "critical review" of an author's oeuvre wouldn't take one book out of eighteen and make it foundational even if there was thematic consistency running through the corpus.

I agree that at times Wilber's rhetoric seems overdone, but to raise the issue of the polemic without taking into account at least all the these factors suggests a dismissive agenda. This dismissive element can be seen when de Quincey states:

Some critics in the field of transpersonal psychology have questioned whether Wilber's vitriol and anger, and lack of compassion are compatible with the kind and level of consciousness required to speak and write from experience about higher, spiritual, states or stages of consciousness. (p. 183 fn. 5)^[8]

De Quincey is leveling a charge (i.e., Wilber doesn't have the spiritual level to talk/write about spirituality because he is polemical) that he faults Wilber for leveling against Whitehead: "Wilber is on shaky ground when he questions Whitehead's relevance to transpersonal psychology/philosophy because he didn't have transpersonal experiences" (JCS p. 203). Thus it seems that de Quincey is willing to share this shaky ground with Wilber when it is in his interest. Besides, it is only shaky ground from an objectivist position that is committed to divorcing the map from the mapmaker. Wilber is clear that "It's not that there is a map on the one hand and the territory on the other--that's the nasty Cartesian dualism--but rather that the map is itself a performance of the territory it is trying to map" (BHE p. 65).

Now it must be noted that here de Quincey is dumbing down Wilber's critique of Whitehead. Wilber does not deny that Whitehead might have had transpersonal experiences. Rather, he quite specifically claims that Whitehead did not obtain subject permanence and that his metaphysics does not contain injunctions that will cultivate subject permanence.^[9] On both counts the evidence is in Wilber's favor regardless of whether or not de Quincey is convinced (by reading Whitehead) that he had stabilized some transpersonal stages. Even Jeffrey Sanders (1998), a Whiteheadian Scholar, acknowledges (in his excellent essay, "Dharma, Karma, and Yoga: Whitehead and Wilber As 'Transpersonal' Philosophers?") that:

Unfortunately there is no biographical documentation that Whitehead ever experienced non-ordinary states, nor is there any evidence to date (of which I am aware) that he maintained any spiritual disciplines that would be taken as satisfactory for producing a philosophy that would be adequate for understanding the transpersonal. If Ken Wilber is correct in saying that those developmentally stabilized at a certain level of consciousness cannot grasp the stages of consciousness developmentally above them, then this is a serious critique. I think Wilber is correct in this point. (p. 2-3) ^[10]

If de Quincey is going to examine Wilber's polemic as a way of questioning if Wilber has the reference points to talk "Spirit" (and to claim that he isn't intersubjective) then isn't Wilber justified in questioning Whitehead's subjective experience of the Divine? To deny, as de Quincey does, that it is relevant whether or not Whitehead had subject permanence, of which there is no evidence (even if he had some lucid dreams), is to fall into a form of materialism where the subjective context is cut off from the objective production.

De Quincey suggests that polemics are not spiritual, so how can we trust that Wilber has access to Spirit given that he is such a mean guy? I can appreciate the intuition here, but I find this simple formula to be problematic. First, it ignores the many places that Wilber provides first-person phenomenological accounts of spiritual states, not to mention Grace and Grit, a moving account of the difficulties and joys of spiritual life in the face of death. Secondly, I have talked to many people who have reported that they have no problem with Wilber's polemic and in fact some have claimed it was the polemic that woke many of them up from a spiritual slumber and allowed them to step into a clearing that had been obscured. Some have even referred to it as a "sword of compassion." Third, to equate spirituality with "niceness" is to dismiss vast regions of spirituality, including various techniques, experiences, and approaches. For example what about the Zen master who breaks a stick over a statue of Buddha while practitioners are doing zazen or, Thich Nhat Hanh's (1999) poem "I Will Say I Want It All," which describes how an individual burns down his friends house: "My fire will destroy everything and remove his only life raft after a shipwreck." So to say Wilber's polemic is non-spiritual is simplistic and naïve. There is a dignity and a disaster to Wilber's use of polemics. The dignity is, as many people have reported, that it can serve a transformative function: a wake-up call (i.e., it opens them up to Spirit in ways that had been ulterior). Also, it has served to stimulate much needed conversation around crucial issues. The disaster is that people's feelings have been hurt and some have found it simply distasteful -- thus closing them off to potential insights of Wilber's work due to the aggressive packaging. Why not honor Wilber for bringing a certain intention to his writing and "owning" it. After all, authenticity is considered to be a quality of spiritual life. We should be as willing to look at our response to polemics (pro or con) as we are willing to challenge or support the use of them.

It is noteworthy, and somewhat ironic, that de Quincey has written about his own polemical excesses.^[11] Taken by itself, de Quincey's account suggests that he recognized, in a most painful way, the limits of polemical attacks. Yet in light of his JCS review of Wilber's works, it seems reasonable to wonder whether de Quincey has chosen simply to turn down the volume on his former naked intellectual aggressiveness, in effect taking his polemical quest "below the radar." For though more "moderate" in tone, his misrepresentations indicate that de Quincey is altogether willing, as it suits him, to be "polemical" in making wholesale distortions of Wilber's work. As the phrase "passive aggressive" makes clear, words themselves can carry the burden of polemic, even when tone declares its innocence.

Returning to the discourse of pop-psychology, de Quincey postulates that Wilber's emotional outbursts are a sign of the intersubjective quadrant (i.e., feelings) sneaking back into the theory. Yet there's no need for it to "sneak" back in when a whole range of feelings are present in Wilber's vast opus, especially in Grace and Grit. Personally I find Wilber to exhibit more feelings in his writings than most authors who seem committed to the sterile, academic, non-attached mode. Wilber exhibits humor, poesis, seriousness, wisdom, anger, joy, scholarship, personality, irony, compassion, sarcasm, etc. I find this to be very refreshing. I don't always agree with Wilber's rhetoric and characterizations but I enjoy knowing exactly where he stands and his style demands that I engage critical issues. To show that Wilber isn't a feelingless ogre we only have to look at where he places "feelings" in his model, which is exactly where de Quincey goes to substantiate his case.

In disregarding this distinction, de Quincey opens the door to questions about how closely he read the one book that he says he gave the greatest attention to in prepping for his article. Certainly Wilber's theoretical precision about two different meanings of "feeling" raises serious doubts about de Quincey's characterization of Wilber as "anti-feeling." In a footnote he says, "For Wilber, only when we have transcended feelings and developed to the higher level of consciousness of reason can we adopt the 'perspectival' stance..." (JCS p. 183). Clearly, this is not Wilber's position. Wilber emphasizes "transcend and include" throughout his writings. To miss that is proof positive that de Quincey is selectively reading. Wilber is very clear that feelings and emotions (feelings-1) are foundational for more complex organizations of mind. In fact Wilber's whole integral agenda can be summed up as the integration of body, mind, and spirit in self, culture, and nature. Moreover, Wilber talks at length about how the centaur (the stage after rational) is a place of deep integration of the body/mind -- redressing the dissociation of the previous stages. It is one thing to suggest that Wilber tends to emphasize cognition over feelings or emotions (feelings-1) it is quite another to claim that he is "anti-feeling." For Wilber, the development of cognition is essential to the ability to experience deeper and more spiritual emotions (feelings-2). In other words, the increased capacity of cognition creates a space for feelings-2 to expand and complexify. To approach Wilber from a body vs. mind or emotions vs. cognition perspective, as de Quincey does, is to miss entirely the complex relationships between the categories that he posits. Wilber's emphasis on development is an implicit (and at times explicit) emphasis on the value of emotional growth.

De Quincey's claim that Wilber is "anti-feeling" is primarily the product of two issues. First, de Quincey simply misunderstands the difference between the ontological categories of fundamental (more extrinsic value) and significant (more intrinsic value) in Wilber's model. Second, de Quincey misinterprets Wilber's critical stance against the confusion of locating rational and trans-rational feelings (feelings-2) in pre-rational structures (feelings-1) as Wilber's entire position on feelings. This reduction of Wilber's position is facilitated because de Quincey himself makes this confusion.

The premise of Eye to Eye is that there is a great spectrum of human consciousness; and this means that men and women have available to them a spectrum of different modes of knowing, each of which discloses a different type of world.... Put in its simplest form, there is, at the very least, the eye of flesh, the eye of mind, and the eye of contemplation. (p. 84)

The three eyes of knowing are, of course, just a simplified version of the universal Great Chain of Being. If we picture the Great Chain as having five levels (matter, body, mind, soul, and spirit), men and women have five eyes available to them (material prehension, bodily emotion, mental ideas, the soul's archetypal cognition, and spiritual gnosis). Likewise, if the Great Chain is divided into twelve levels, we have twelve eyes, or twelve levels of awareness and knowing. ...each of which is important and quite valid when dealing with its own level, but gravely confused if it attempts to see into other domains. (p. 18)

Not only does de Quincey overlook Wilber's commitment to epistemological pluralism; he doesn't even mention that Wilber discusses four "validity claims," one for each quadrant. None of these validity claims can be reduced to another. At no point does de Quincey explore or discuss Wilber's notion of the intersubjective truth claim (justness, cultural fit, mutual understanding, rightness). It is hard to imagine why an exploration of Wilber's position on intersubjectivity would be silent on this important concept. After all, what Wilber is suggesting is radical to many people. He is claiming that intersubjectivity represents a valid form of truth to be found nowhere else and irreducible to any other type or approach to truth.

Another example of this kind of sloppiness occurs when de Quincey says, "[Wilber's] critique of feeling seems to completely miss the intrinsically relational and intersubjective quality of feeling-based consciousness" (JCS p. 183). De Quincey is absolutely right. This is because Wilber isn't critiquing or denying relationality of feelings. He actually champions it. What Wilber is critiquing is the privileging of feelings-1 over thinking and the reduction of feelings-2 to feelings-1. For Wilber, to value feelings-1 at the expense of thinking and feelings-2 is a reactionary position trying, understandably, to compensate for the long held dominance of the dissociated mind in Western culture, when what is needed is a revaluation of values (an overcoming of the dualistic body vs. mind), not a simple reversal of values (body good, mind bad). This is Wilber's critique. Also, if de Quincey were to explore (as we will below) what Wilber means by "mutual understanding" and "resonance," he would see that Wilber honors the epistemological validity of "feeling-based consciousness."

Even if de Quincey is unsatisfied with Wilber on these issues, a fair critique of Wilber's epistemology as it relates to feelings (both 1 and 2) cannot validly ignore the many places where Wilber discusses his commitment to epistemological pluralism, mutual understanding, multiple validity claims, etc. Moreover, de Quincey would need to explore with more precision Wilber account of how feelings relate to the body and the mind.^[13] Wilber's position is that feelings-1 are a valid form of knowledge in their respective domain and that feelings-2 are an important part of every mode of knowing (body, emotions, mind, soul, and spirit). Now if de Quincey wants to argue that feelings-1 have a larger domain than Wilber grants, then he would have to spell out what he means by "feelings" and "emotions." It is unacceptable (because accurate) to claim that Wilber considers all feelings as epistemologically inferior. Neither feelings-1 nor feelings-2 are always epistemologically inferior or superior; certainly not by Wilber's account. He leaves no real doubt that epistemological status depends on context, what you are trying to know, and what you are comparing it to.

In the second quote I want to examine, de Quincey states: "Wilber is very clearly against the ontological significance of feeling. It is certainly true that in Integral Psychology, as we will see, he 'categorically rejects' the notion that feeling could play a fundamental ontological role" (p. 184). In this quote it is easy to see that for de Quincey significance = fundamental; but Wilber takes pains to show that this is not the case in his use of both terms.^[14] Thus, de Quincey's "clearly true" is actually clearly false. While Wilber limits the ontological significance of feelings-1 in relation to more complex modes of being (symbol making, concept forming etc), he simultaneously acknowledges that feelings-1 are ontologically more fundamental than other dimensions of being. As for the ontological significance of feelings, Wilber goes on to explain in that same passage that consciousness across the spectrum is itself more of a "feeling-awareness" than a "thinking-awareness." This feeling-awareness is of course referring to feelings-2.

De Quincey is right insofar as Wilber does claim that feelings-1 are less significant than reason, but at the same time Wilber explains that feelings-1 are more significant than impulses, which are more significant than perception etc.^[15] So while feelings-1are ontologically less significant than some basic structures, they are more significant than others. Likewise, some feelings-2 (e.g., fear) are ontologically less significant than other feelings-2 (e.g., universal compassion). Thus Wilber isn't against feelings, he just sets feelings-1 as one wave in a nested holarchy and feelings-2 as a spectrum of feeling-awareness that spans the entire holarchy.

In other words, as rationality transcends and includes feelings-1, it has more significance (intrinsic value) because it represents more of the Kosmos (i.e., it is more complex). At the same time Wilber explains that feelings-1 are more ontologically fundamental than rationality because they are the very foundation for rationality. Thus, de Quincey is deeply mistaken when he claims that Wilber denies feelings as having a fundamental ontological role. Wilber defines his terms (fundamental and significant) with care and precision, so it is not reasonable to assert that he leaves open to question how he uses these two words. It must be emphasized that Wilber is quite explicit that feelings-1 are in a nested holarchy, where they are more fundamental (less significant) than perceptions etc. and simultaneously less fundamental (more significant) than irritability etc., while feelings and emotions, as feelings-2, are simultaneously more important (fundamental) and less important (significant) than other feelings/emotions along the developmental line of affect. Here lies some of the paradox and mystery that de Quincey claims is absent in Wilber's model. De Quincey doesn't seem to appreciate the nuances of many dimensions of Wilber's model.

To see that Wilber does posit the body and emotions (feelings-1) as foundational, we only have to consult Integral Psychology, the text that de Quincey is drawing on to claim otherwise. For example, after discussing how body therapies deal with the "preformal physical and emotional bodies," Wilber explains: "This does not mean that somatic therapy is useless; just the opposite, although it is less significant, it is more fundamental" (p. 249). Wilber goes on to say that therapies that "directly address the physical and feeling body (F-1 and F-2) -- are all of great importance as the foundation, or first floor, of an integral therapy" (p. 249).

After emphasizing that feelings-1 are ontologically fundamental Wilber makes the important distinction between "feelings" of the endoceptual sort (feelings-1) and the kind of body/mind of vision-logic (feelings-2):

Gendlin's "felt-meaning" -- a zone between bodily feelings and mental conceptions -- is what Arieti (The Intrapsychic Self) calls 'endocept,' which I have listed as one of the basic waves in the charts. Endocepts, as the link between felt-body and thought--mind, are the gateway to the emotional shadow. Gendlin's "felt meaning" has often been confused with centauric awareness... (p. 244)

A full-spectrum therapist works with the body, the shadow, the persona, the ego, the existential self, the soul and spirit, attempting to bring awareness to all of them, so that all of them may join consciousness in the extraordinary return voyage to the Self and Spirit that grounds and moves the entire display. (p. 108)

In the last quote I want to highlight, which occurs right before de Quincey moves into his section on intersubjectivity, de Quincey claims: "In place of the messiness of feeling, Wilber offers us his neat, massive intellectual construction" (JCS p. 184). I agree, it is neat and "clean" in many regards but Wilber clearly acknowledges the messiness of feelings and the entire messiness of growth. In the beginning of Integral Psychology, Wilber states: "There is nothing linear or rigid about these various waves. As we will abundantly see, individual development through the various waves of consciousness is a very fluid and flowing affair. ...Overall development is a very messy affair!" (p. 6). The neatness, as it were, is a clear conceptual framework for being able to help make sense of the messiness. Here de Quincey is losing site of the fact that the value of a map is clarity, a clarity to help make sense of the messy territory. To fault Wilber for trying to provide a clear map, while he does acknowledge the "messiness" of the territory, is remarkably petty.

So Wilber isn't against feelings and emotions, as feelings-1 or feelings-2, even if his writing style doesn't honor them in the way de Quincey would prefer. In fact, Wilber provides a complex ontology that goes beyond a simple emotions versus cognition arrangement. Clearly, there is a strong emphasis in Wilber's writings on cognition, and there is room to argue, like de Quincey does, that this is at the expense of "feelings."^[17] However, keep in mind that Wilber values cognitive development because of the important role it plays in allowing new forms of feelings and emotions (feelings-2) to manifest in subjectivity. In this regard, cognition appears to lead emotion.^[18] For example, you can't have universal compassion until you stabilize the ability to take multiple perspectives. In sum, a close look at Wilber's ontology reveals that feelings have a complex relationship with cognition. Sometimes they are of equal value, other times they are inferior, and other times they are superior. It all depends on what context you are talking about. Even in Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, Wilber says things like "Rationality brings a new space of deeper feeling and greater passion" (CW 6 p. 391). Clearly, Wilber has a more complicated exposé of feelings than de Quincey suggests.

This 'regression in service of ego' temporarily returns consciousness to the early trauma (or simply puts it back in touch with the alienated feelings, drives, or impulses), allows it to befriend and reintegrate the alienated feelings, and thus restores a relative harmony to the psyche. (p. 95)

Moreover, it is definitely true that aspects of ["a feeling dimension of being"] can be repressed by the higher structures of the mind (ego, superego, conscience), which can result in various types of painful pathology. And that, finally a recapture (in the form of regression in service of the ego) of that lost potential is required in order to heal the damage and regain a more fluid, flowing, feeling-ful outlook on life. (p. 140)

So one of the things you do in therapy -- in 'uncovering therapies' -- is to relax the repression barrier and allow yourself to feel your body, feel your feelings, feel your emotions, and try to understand why you repressed them in the first place. You then befriend these lost feelings and reintegrate them with the mental-ego to form a more wholesome and accurate self-image. (IP p. 458)

As for Wilber's critique of Stanislav Grof's model, de Quincey states that Wilber has been a "severe critic" of the idea that "reliving the existential pangs of the birth experience could be a gateway to transpersonal consciousness" (JCS p. 184). This is remarkably inaccurate. In fact Wilber has explained that his concern with Grof's model is not that perinatal experiences can be doorways into transpersonal realms -- he admits that they can be. Rather, Wilber challenges Grof for his confusing use of the term perinatal to refer to both biological birth and existential crisis. He also questions the massive generalizations Grof makes about consciousness based on a narrow context (Holotropic breathwork or LSD sessions). So once again, de Quincey ignores many nuanced distinctions to build his pejorative case.^[22]

Up to this point I have followed the momentum de Quincey uses to set the scene to explore Wilber's position on intersubjectivity. At each bend in the river, I have questioned this momentum and brought to light what I think are half-truths and gross misrepresentations. I have challenged de Quincey's use of Wilber's polemical to support his claim that Wilber is anti-feeling. I have exposed how de Quincey confuses significant and fundamental, rendering his interpretation of Wilber's ontological stance on feelings/emotions inaccurate. And I have argued that de Quincey misrepresents Wilber's position on therapeutic regression by confusing it with his critique of ideological regression. Now, before I examine de Quincey's "Intersubjectivity" section I want to highlight what I see as the difficulties with Wilber's approach to intersubjectivity and suggest how de Quincey intuits these problem areas but misconstrues them.

Second, related to the first weakness, just looking up "intersubjectivity" in the index of any of Wilber's books will not take you to many of the places the topic is engaged. In fact I have found the index to be very unhelpful in tracking down the places Wilber discusses intersubjectivity. It turns out that the clarifying passages are often coupled with other topics, which are the ones getting indexed (so you're better off looking up the context (e.g., phenomenology, worldspace, mutual understanding)).

Third, Wilber uses the same term, "intersubjectivity," to refer to at least five different dimensions of intersubjectivity. Thus, when approaching Wilber on the topic of intersubjectivity one needs to be sensitive to the context, which is often the only indicator of which type of intersubjectivity is being explained. Though this presentation doesn't afford the space for a thorough explanation of these dimensions, let me briefly introduce them with terms I have generated: ^[23]

2. intersubjectivity-as-context: the context created by multiple intersubjective structures (i.e., meshworks) which are constitutive of the subject and create the space in which both subjects and objects arise (e.g., physical laws, morphic fields, linguistic, moral, cultural, biological, and aesthetic structures). These cultural contexts, backgrounds, and practices are nondiscursive and inaccessible via direct experience.

3. Intersubjectivity-as-resonance: the occurrence of "mutual recognition" and "mutual understanding" between two holons of similar depth. Within this dimension there are Worldspaces and Worldviews.

4. Intersubjectivity-as-relationship: the way we identify with and have relationship with other subjects and objects. Within this dimension there are at least three types of relationships.