INTRODUCTION Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 PART II Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Page 4 PART III Page 1 Page 2 PART IV Page 1 Page 2 APPENDIX A APPENDIX B NOTES Notes 1-15 Notes 16-35 Notes 36-44 Notes 45-56

Part I. INTRODUCTION--Systems Theory versus Hermeneutics: Why Both Are Important (page 2)

What Do "Inside" and "Outside" Mean?

     In order to get at the heart of these issues, we need a simple terminology for the many different uses of the words like "inside," "internal," "interior," and "outside," "external," "exterior," because different authorities seem to mean different things by those words. Obviously this is a bit of a semantic bramble, so we need to keep it as simple as we can while still covering as many bases as necessary (in order to do as little violence as possible to the native perspective-dimensions of being-in-the-world).

     Because the quadrants themselves represent four of the most basic perspectives of being-in-the-world, the simplest way to proceed is to use them as a reference point. As previously noted, figure 2 is a schematic of the quadrants, with a holon drawn in each quadrant. (A holon is a whole/part, or whole that is a part of other wholes. The "boundary" between the "inside" and the "outside" of each of the holons in fig. 2 is simply the boundary between its "wholeness"--on its own inside--and its "partness"--or where it is a part of a whole that is outside of its own boundary. We will be looking at the "insides" and the "outsides" of each of these four major types of holons--the inside and the outside of an "I," a "we," an "it," and an "its.") Of course, there are not different holons in the four quadrants; the four quadrants are the four dimensions of every holon.⁴ But it is easier and simpler to say things like "holons in the UR quadrant," and so on, which is fine, as long as the tetra-nature of any holon is remembered.

     With that in mind, we can use the world interior to refer to any occasions or holons in the Left-Hand quadrants, and exterior for any occasions in the Right-Hand quadrants. The upper quadrants refer to individual or singular holons, and the lower quadrants refer to plural, social, or communal holons. So the four quadrants represent the interiors and the exteriors of the singular and plural (fig. 2).

     How are these related to first-, second-, and third-person perspectives? "First person" refers to the person who is speaking ( singular: I, me; plural: we, us); "second person" refers to the person spoken to ( singular: you; plural: all of you); and "third person" refers to the person or thing being spoken about ( singular: he, she, him, her, it; plural: they, them, its).

     Although with singular and plural forms the "three persons" gives us six perspectives, for most purposes, those condense down into 4 fundamental perspectives: I, we, it, and its. The main reason is that, although the second-person "you" is crucially important, if I am a first-person speaker talking with second-person you, the clear implication is that you can understand me to some degree, and therefore each "you" actually exists as part of a "we," or else no communication would occur at all. This is why "you/thou" (second person) is often treated together with "we" (or first-person plural, which is why I sometimes summarize first-, second-, and third-person pronouns as "I, we, and it"). We will in no way be neglecting second-person perspectives, but for simple overviews, they can usually be included as part of first-personal plural perspectives--you and I understand each other only when we can both say "we."

     A first-person perspective, reality, or dimension is something that can be seen only by a speaker in a particular worldspace. (As we will see, "speaker" does not necessarily mean linguistic speaker, but any prehensive subject--cells to ants to apes.) A first-person holon can certainly see and feel exterior objects and events, but the one thing a first person can see (that nobody else can see) is his or her own interior space--the space described in "I" language. This I-space is essentially the Upper-Left quadrant. It refers to the interior phenomenological spaces of an individual (singular) holon. An "I-space" is the phenomenological space brought forth, enacted, and illumined by a particular subject of consciousness.

     If a second person--such as you--enters my worldspace (or my "I-space"), then you and I might be able to enter into communication, dialogue, and some sort of understanding--as is hopefully happening right now with the words you are reading. If that occurs, second-person "you" and first-person "I" become part of a first-person plural "we" (or a hermeneutic circle of understanding). Of course, if you and I were together in the same room, we would take turns being first and second person, so that a mutual dialogue would occur that would more easily enact a "we" (which occurs when both you and I can say, "We understand each other"--not necessarily agree with each other, but understand each other). But the essential point is that a "you" and an "I" can come together to form some sort of phenomenological "we-space."

     This "we-space" is essentially the Lower-Left quadrant (also sometimes called a "thou/we" space, which is what is usually meant by second person). The great mystery and miracle of any "we" is something that we will return to throughout this presentation, although it would be much better if you were here and we could take turns being the speaker.

     So interior means any phenomena in an I-space or we-space (i.e., any holon in the Left-Hand quadrants: the first-person realities available to a holon as a bearer of sentience or prehension). Exterior, on the other hand, means any phenomena apprehended in a third-person perspective (i.e., any phenomena or holon in the Right-Hand quadrants: any phenomena in an "it-space").

     Here's an example. You and I are talking, and we are talking about another person, George. George, of course, is the third person here. An interesting question is whether or not George can be a part of our conversation. That is, is it possible for George to understand what you and I are talking about? Let's assume George is a friend; in that case, the answer would be yes, in many ways George can join the conversation, and all three of us can take turns speaking (or take turns being the first person), and therefore all three of us could become part of a "we"--we understand each other. So when you and I are talking about that third-person "him," there are many cases in which that "him" or that "her" can potentially become part of a "we," or part of a first-person plural phenomenological space--part of a we-space of mutual understanding.

     But what if George is from Russia? Or Mars? Or is in a coma? Then George is a third person who, under those circumstances, can only be a third person--can only be somebody we talk about, not somebody we can talk to or with. In effect, George is then nothing but an "it," or a third-person with whom we cannot enter into a relation of "we." George cannot become a real second person (with whom we talk), and therefore, in those instances, George cannot become part of our first-person plural "we."

     So the really interesting question about third persons is whether they can ever become part of a "we" (any sort of "we," or any sort of shared or common perceptions, feelings, prehensions, and so on), or whether those third persons are fated merely to be "its." My dog Chester, for example, shares at least a few perceptions with me--I know he sees that bone, and I often think that WE are happy playing fetch. Chester is not merely an "it" to me; "he" (the third person we are now talking about) can on occasion become a second person that I am speaking to, and on some occasions I know that we share at least some feelings, so that Chester-the-second-person becomes Chester-part-of-the-first-person-plural we.

     Notice that the definition of "third person" is "the person or thing being spoken about." This is a very interesting distinction found only in third person. A first person (as the person speaking) is, by definition, a sentient being; so is the second person. But the third person, according to the standard definition, can be a "person" or a "thing," which means it can be sentient or insentient. Whether it is either of those, a third person is something that we are talking about (not to or with). Either that third person is somebody that we could be talking to but they are not here right now; or that third person is somebody (or something) that, even if they were here, we could not communicate with (for whatever reasons). The former is a "he," "she," "him," "her" (or plural: "they," "them"), and the later is an "it" (plural: "its").

     Thus, as we define interior as any first-person (singular or plural) realities, we can define the exterior dimensions of any occasion as those aspects that can be seen or felt as a third person. In other words, they are those aspects of any occasion (or any holon) that you or I can be aware of but are not in some sort of communication with (either because we cannot do so now but might do so in the future--in which case the third person is a he/she/they that can become part of a "we"; or because these are third-person occasions that we can never or will never be in communication with--in which case the third person is only an "it" or "its" that will never enter a circle of "we" [see below]).

     That is why most of the essentials of the indigenous perspectives are reflected in the four quadrants: I, we, it, and its. The other perspectives are crucially important in their own right, but the interesting question is whether they can be mutually engaged (as part of a "we" of common prehensions) or whether, for whatever reasons, they are on the "it" side of the street.

     At the same time, this does not mean that the "it" dimensions are somehow superficial or derogatory; on the contrary, they represent the objective and interobjective dimensions of being-in-the-world, crucially important dimensions that include everything from atoms to molecules to ecosystems to morphic fields to subtle energies to DNA. It is simply that all of those dimensions can be portrayed or depicted in "it"-language, or third-person terms that remain as third-person terms. In other words, they are the exterior dimensions of events (or the Right-Hand dimensions).⁵

     I, we, it, and its--the interior and exterior of the singular and the plural. Any given holon, say a feeling of love for my family, can be approached from (at least) these four native perspectives. Looked at from the interior or first-person perspective, there is an "I-space," a feeling of love, that overlaps with mutual feelings with other family members, so that there is a "we-space" shared by the other I's in my family (each UL subjectivity is part of a LL circle of intersubjectivity). Those phenomena can only be seen and accessed with first-person modes of awareness. In the Upper-Right quadrant, on the other hand, that feeling of love is correlated with an activated limbic system and increased levels of serotonin and dopamine, among other things (all of which are accessed with third-person modes of inquiry). And in the Lower-Right quadrant, I am part of a family system of interobjective processes--or an interwoven system or network of exteriors--which include modes of communication, family income, diet, drug and alcohol consumption, patterns of transportation, and so on, all of which are intimately meshed with, help bring forth, and cannot finally be separated from any interior feelings I might have.

     Every occasion is what it is by virtue of networks of interconnections with each other, different aspects or dimensions of which are enacted, brought forth, and illumined by different perspectives on those occasions (perspectives that are themselves embedded in natural languages). AQAL metatheory handles this by saying that the social aspects (LR) of occasions never exist apart from the cultural aspects (LL), which never exist apart from the intentional (UL) and behavioral (UR) aspects--and so on around the circle of tetra-enacted dimensions of being-in-the-world.

     That is a quick summary of the interior and exterior dimensions. Now we can introduce "inside" and "outside." By inside and outside, let us simply mean the inside and outside of any occasion wherever it is found. That is, the holons in all four quadrants have insides and outsides. As you can see in figure 2, there is the inside and outside of an "I"-holon, a "we"-holon, an "it"-holon, and an "its"-holon.

     That gives us 8 native perspectives (the view from the inside and from the outside of holons in the four quadrants). I am not saying that those are the only native perspectives available to sentience; clearly, there are likely an infinity of permutations and combinations of the ways that sentient beings can see and touch and hold each other. These 8 perspectives are nothing but a selection from among that infinity; nonetheless, they seem to be the fewest number we need to cover most of the bases. These perspectives, as we will continue to see, are not abstract academic exercises but indigenous stances available to sentient beings in general.

A Kosmos Composed of Perspectives

      In AQAL metatheory, individual holons (quarks, atoms, molecules, cells, organisms) are sentient beings, all the way up, all the way down. Even atoms have prehension. If you are not comfortable pushing sentience all the way down, feel free to pick up the story at whatever evolutionary point you think that experience or proto-experience of some sort emerges in the universe (and you can picture all of the lower forms as "precursors" of experience and awareness).⁶ Presumably by the time we get to humans, the native (folk) perspectives of first-, second-, and third-perspectives have emerged, and you can take it from there.

     But if we do view the Kosmos as being composed primarily of sentient beings--not systems, not processes, not webs, not information, not matter, not energy, but sentient beings--then we must simultaneously build a Kosmos composed of perspectives--not feelings, not awareness, not perceptions, not consciousness, for all of those are always already perspectives. If quarks have prehension, then the first quark is not a first particle but a first person. And whatever that quark registers is not a second particle but a second person. There is no way around this. The universe is built of perspectives.

     Even a prehensively-challenged scientific materialist, who believes that the Kosmos is composed of nothing but matter (i.e., really frisky dirt), presents a picture or model of the universe that is itself a third-person object held in his first-person mind, a model developed via a community of third-person-plural scientists all trying to hold the same third-person model in their minds. I am not saying that model isn't there; I am saying that it always already exists within a series of first-, second-, and third-person perspectives. Whatever else that model is--and it is many things--it is a third-person object in a first-person prehension.

     Each sentient being (or individual holon) registers other sentient beings (or individual holons) in its own experiential or proto-experiential fashion--but none of them can register their existence in any way other than as a perspective. There is never a subject that sees an object. There is no actual perception in which one entity sees another entity, for that is already a first-person perspective on a second or third person. Thus, there is no real space that is not always already a space-arising-as-a-perspective; therefore we cannot say that occasions (or holons or beings) come into existence and then see each other, because the "seeing each other" and the "existence" cannot be asserted apart from one another. To say that the quadrants arise simultaneously is to say that ontological dimensions and epistemological perspectives are one and the same thing, which is why we often call them dimension-perspectives (and further say that they tetra-arise or tetra-enact, simultaneously and together: to say the quadrants arise simultaneously is to say that first and second and third persons arrive on the scene together).⁷

     An integral approach recognizes a Kosmos composed of sentient beings, and sentient beings do not have awareness or feelings or perceptions, they have perspectives, within whose horizons those other features arise and outside of which nothing can believably be said to exist. I am not suggesting that there isn't a universe outside of human perspectives, only that there isn't a universe outside of sentient beings' perspectives, since the universe is composed of sentient beings (holons), all the way up, all the way down, and therefore the universe is, top to bottom, composed of perspectives.⁸

     Before the evolutionary emergence of human beings, there was (I believe) an entire universe of sentient beings--quarks to atoms to molecules to cells to ants to apes--that were already arising for each other, to each other, as perspectives, because whatever it was that emerged first in a self-aware universe was not a first thing but a first sentient being among other sentient beings: in other words, it was a first person among second and third persons, who were themselves first persons among other second and third persons.

     It appears, then, that when a universe comes into being, if that universe has any sort of sentience at all, then what arrives on the scene simultaneously with whatever else arrives on the scene is: perspectives. This is why, whatever else the Kosmos is built of, it is built of perspectives, which are always already on the scene whenever two or more sentient beings exist (which is to say, always already everywhere that sentience is). Perspectives arise in emptiness: such is the beginning of sentient worlds.

     The four quadrants (and 8 indigenous perspectives) are simply some of the different ways to look at the perspectives that seem inherent in the universe. These perspectives are not so much a priori (prior to existence), but a simultori, if you will forgive the corrupted Latin--they simply arrive simultaneously with whatever else arrives. If so, then the overall array of their arrival (traces and hints of which are deposited in natural languages) gives us a new way to understand the universe, a way that focuses on sentient beings instead of third-person notions like systems, particles, webs, processes, or monological subjects prehending objects, feelings, awareness, etc.--all of which are abstractions away from the actual form of sentience.

     We will be pursuing that idea as we proceed; we will also explore the ways that these indigenous perspectives seem to be responsible for the major modes of human inquiry. Remember, for example, that "autopoiesis" was described as the " view from the inside" of the biological organism? Now we can see that organismic autopoiesis is indeed describing a view from the inside--namely, the inside view of the organism looked at in third-person terms (i.e., the view from the inside of a holon in the Upper-Right quadrant [fig. 2]). But organismic autopoiesis is not a view from within an "I" or a "we" or an "its." There are at least 4 different "views from the inside," because there are at least 4 different phenomenological insides (the inside of an I, we, it, and its). Each of those "insides" looks very, very different. Autopoiesis captures one of them very well; the others, not at all.

     (Autopoiesis is attuned to the insides of an it; the insides of an "I" and a "we" are best enacted and illumined with modes of inquiry such as phenomenology and hermeneutics. We will later see that Niklas Luhmann extended organismic or individual autopoiesis to cover the "inside view" of systems--or the inside of an "its"--which is therefore appropriately listed in fig. 3.)

     Likewise, there is not one "view from the outside," but at least 4 important, very different views from the outside (captured best by modes such as empiricism, for the outside of an "it"; structuralism, for the outside of a "I"; and traditional systems theory, for the outside of an "its").

     In short, those 8 indigenous perspectives appear to be responsible for most of the widely used and respected modes of human inquiry, including phenomenology, hermeneutics, empiricism, physical sciences, and systems theory. In the following pages we will be exploring each of those modes of inquiry, highlighting the ways that they unfold from the primordial perspectives available to every sentient holon (and how far down you want to push sentience is up to you).

     We saw in Excerpt B that it is wise to proceed under the prime directive that "Everybody is right." Using an integral calculus of indigenous perspectives to unearth the natural viewpoints that are embedded--and already at work--in the major modes of inquiry allows us to more easily understand why the Kosmos is such that it allows those modes to exist in the first place--which can help us more easily to move toward an Integral Methodological Pluralism that makes abundant room for what sincere researchers are already doing anyway. This in turn allows us to remain faithful to an endeavor of nonexclusion, enfoldment, and enactment, thus finding that the Kosmos itself provides the modes of bringing forth its own manifestations and introducing them to each other, endlessly.

SOME EVERYDAY EXAMPLES

Insides and Outsides of Interiors

     The 8 native perspectives we are highlighting are the insides and outsides of interiors and exteriors (as indicated in fig. 2, which includes singular and plural forms). The inside of an interior holon means, for example, anything on the inside of the boundary of an "I" or a "we."

     The simplest example is my own self-awareness right now--or first-person subjective realities directly felt as "I." This immediate prehension or I-feeling (UL) is fairly straightforward and easy to understand.⁹ Right now, there is a world arising in your I-space; and, like all first-person realties, that world directly and immediately presents itself to your naked awareness. It does not matter if some theorist, adopting a third-person distancing mode, postulates or hypothesizes that these immediate phenomena are mediated by other events (cultural or otherwise); at the moment of their presentation, they are immediate. You do not know this I-space by distance or description but by feeling and acquaintance (not third-person, but first-person).

     Another common example of the inside of an interior holon is the inside of a we-boundary--a first-person plural reality, such as a shared understanding, a shared value, an intersubjective feeling, a group identity, and so on--what we will sometimes call "mutual prehensions." Natural language embeds this view quite often, as when we say, "You and I belong to a circle of friends" (i.e., you and I are inside a we-boundary).

     You cannot see a we-boundary in the exterior or sensorimotor world (these are interior phenomena; all Left-Hand holons are "invisible"); but you and I both know quite clearly who is "in" our circle of friends and who is not (i.e., we know who is "in" and who is "out" of this circle). This "invisible" we-boundary happens to be very real, very obvious, very easy to spot. These interior boundaries, needless to say, hold the key to much of human motivation, dynamics, conflicts, and accords.

     Look now at the outside of an interior holon--that is, anything on the outside of an I or we boundary (but still in an interior space). For example, in my own mind's eye, I can see images and objects, as when I dream, imagine, or visualize. What I see in my mind's eye are not exterior objects but interior objects. They are not forms in the exterior world, like rocks, but they are still outside my proximate I, because "I" see "them" in my mind. They are interior "third persons." They are often called "inner objects," which is fine, but using our terminology, we will also specifically be calling them "interior objects."

     Another common example of the outsides of individual interiors--or something outside my I--is my own unconscious processes, subpersonalities, and certainly multiple personalities--they are all outside my proximate I but still in an interior space. Another item that is outside my I is your I, or how I experience you as a living, feeling subject, in a type of subject-to-subject resonance (and not merely how I see you as an exterior object or it). You are inside my culture but outside my I (we will return to that in a moment).

     Those are some examples of the insides and outsides of a first-person "I" (the insides and outsides of a holon in the UL). There are also the insides and outsides of a "we" (the insides and outsides of a holon in the LL: the insides and outsides of a plural or collective interior). For example, as just indicated, if you and I are friends, or a strong "we," then I share a sympathetic space with you and identify with you in many ways; likewise, there are people who are inside our circle of friends, and those who are outside that phenomenological boundary (or outside that particular hermeneutic circle). We know exactly who is inside that circle and who is outside that circle--we even call them "insiders" and "outsiders."

     A "boundary," of course, is often a fluid thing; and in all cases a boundary is not a barrier but an interface, or a region where two worlds are not just differentiated but joined. As theorists from Saussure to Derrida have noted, any sign has meaning only because it is part of a system of differences; but the equally true converse of that, rarely noted, is that a system of differences itself has no meaning unless part of system of touching, joining, linking, interfacing. A boundary in AQAL space is the region of differentiation-and-integration of various dimension-perspectives. What we are doing here is simply tracing 4 of the most fundamental types of boundaries (belonging to an I, we, it, and its) which are the interfaces between 8 phenomenological worlds (or the insides and the outsides of an I, we, it, and its [fig. 2]).

     Several different "I's" can be "inside" a "we," and that "insideness" is what is usually meant by membership. As we will see, there is a significant difference between "membership," or being a " member of a culture"--which means that we share a similar culture, subculture, or intersubjective commonality--and being a " strand of a social system," or a being a part, link, or strand of a physical or ecological system--a strand in a web--which is a web or network of exterior forms but not interior values and identities. Whether that web is considered as enacted or representational, it is still a web of exteriors (as we saw with autopoiesis). A "we," on the other hand, is established by a shared culture, a shared set of values, identities, prehensions, and so on, and not by geographical proximity or physical location (which would be a system, not a culture: "its," not "we's"). Social holons are networks of shared exteriors or signifiers, but cultural holons are networks of shared interiors or signifieds: intersubjectivity versus interobjectivity, hermeneutics versus ecology.