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Introduction to Volume 6 of the Collected Works
The Revised, Second Edition of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality
The Genesis of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality
Sex,
Ecology, Spirituality was the first theoretical book I had written in almost ten
years, following the events described in Grace and Grit. The previous book,
Transformations of Consciousness (with Jack Engler and Daniel P. Brown), was
completed in 1984; I wrote Grace and Grit in 1991; and then I settled down to
finally write a textbook of transpersonal psychology that I had been planning on doing
for several years. I was calling that textbook System, Self, and Structure, but
somehow it never seemed to get written. Determined to do so, I sat down and begin
transcribing the two-volume work, whereupon I realized, with a shock, that four of the
words I used in the very first paragraph were no longer allowed in academic discourse
(development, hierarchy, transcendental, universal). This, needless to say, put a
considerable cramp in my attempt to write this book, and poor System, Self, and
Structure was, yet again, shelved. (I recently brought out an abridged version of
it with the title Integral Psychology, in volume 4 of the Collected
Works).
What had happened in my ten-year writing hiatus, and to which I had paid insufficient
attention, is that extreme postmodernism had rather completely invaded academia in
general and cultural studies in particular--even the alternative colleges and
institutes were speaking postmodernese with an authoritarian thunder. The politically
correct were policing the types of serious discourse that could, and could not, be
uttered in academe. Pluralistic relativism was the only acceptable worldview. It
claimed that all truth is culturally situated (except its own truth, which is true for
all cultures); it claimed there are no transcendental truths (except its own
pronouncements, which transcend specific contexts); it claimed that all hierarchies or
value rankings are oppressive and marginalizing (except its own value ranking, which is
superior to the alternatives); it claimed that there are no universal truths (except
its own pluralism, which is universally true for all peoples).
The downsides of extreme postmodernism and pluralistic relativism are now well-known
and widely acknowledged, but at the time I was trying to write System, Self, and
Structure, they were thought to be gospel and were as religiously embraced, making
any sort of developmental and transcendental studies anathema. I therefore set
System, Self, and Structure aside, and began to ponder the best way to proceed,
feeling rather like a salmon who had first to swim upstream in order to have any fun at
all.
But I have been dwelling merely on the downsides of postmodernism and pluralistic
relativism. Their positive benefits are equally numerous and far-reaching, and deserve
a hearing as well. As I have tried to suggest in several places (e.g., The Marriage
of Sense and Soul, Integral Psychology, the Introduction to volume 4 of the
Collected Works), pluralistic relativism is actually a very high developmental
achievement, stemming from the postformal levels of consciousness, which disclose a
series of very important truths. ("Postformal" means the cognitive stages
lying immediately beyond linear rationality or formal operational thinking. Thus,
cognitive development proceeds from sensorimotor to preoperational to concrete
operational to formal operational to postformal cognition, to possibly higher modes
[see below]. I also refer to postformal cognition as network-logic or
vision-logic--Gebser called it integral-aperspectival--and it is
vision-logic that drives the best of postmodernism).
As I suggested in those publications, the truths of postmodernism include
constructivism (the world is not just a perception but an interpretation);
contextualism (all truths are context-dependent, and contexts are boundless); and
integral-aperspectivism (no context is finally privileged, so an integral view must
include multiple perspectives; pluralism; multiculturalism). All of those important
truths can be derived from the beginning stages of postformal vision-logic, and
postmodernism at its best is an elucidation of their profound importance.
In particular, the previous stages of concrete operational (which supports a worldview
called "mythic-membership") and formal operational (which supports a
worldview called "universal formalism") have inherent limitations and
weaknesses in them, and these limitations, when pressed into social action, produce
various types of rigid social hierarchies, mechanistic worldviews that ignore local
color, and universalistic pronouncements about human beings that violate the rich
differences between cultures, peoples, and places. But once consciousness evolves from
formal to postformal--and thus evolves from universal formalism to pluralistic
relativism--these multiple contexts and pluralistic tapestries come jumping to the
fore, and postmodernism has spent much of the last two decades attempting to
deconstruct the rigid hierarchies, formalisms, and oppressive schemes that are
inherent in the preformal-to-formal stages of consciousness evolution.
But pluralistic relativism is not itself the highest stage of development, as numerous
studies have consistently shown (see Integral Psychology). When vision-logic
matures into its middle and late phases, pluralistic relativism increasingly gives way
to more holistic modes of awareness, which begin to weave the pluralistic voices
together into beautiful tapestries of integral intent. Pluralistic relativism gives
way to universal integralism. Where pluralism frees the many different voices
and multiple contexts, universal integralism begins to bring them together into a
harmonized chorus. (Universal integralism thus stands on the brink of even higher
developments, which directly disclose the transpersonal and spiritual
realms--developments wherein the postformal mental gives way to the postmental or
supramental altogether).
But this leaves pluralistic relativism in a difficult position. Having heroically
developed beyond a rigid universal formalism, it became suspicious of any universals at
all, and thus it tended to fight the emergence of universal integralism with the same
ferocity that it deconstructed all previous systems. It turned its critical guns not
just on pre-pluralistic stages (which was appropriate), but also on post-pluralistic
stages (which was disastrous). Deconstructive postmodernism thus began to actively
fight any higher stages of growth, often turning academia into a charnel ground of
deconstructive fury. Little new was created; past glories were simply torn down. Little
novel was constructed; previous constructions were merely deconstructed. Few new
buildings were erected; old ones were simply blown up. Postmodernism often degenerated
into the nihilism and narcissism for which it is now so well-known, and the vacant
haunted hollow eyes of professional academia, peering through the smoking ruins, told
the tale most sadly.
One thing was very clear to me, as I struggled with how best to proceed in an
intellectual climate dedicated to deconstructing anything that crossed its path: I
would have to back up and start at the beginning, and try to create a vocabulary for a
more constructive philosophy. Beyond pluralistic relativism is universal integralism;
I therefore sought to outline a philosophy of universal integralism.
Put differently, I sought a world philosophy. I sought an integral philosophy,
one that would believably weave together the many pluralistic contexts of science,
morals, aesthetics, Eastern as well as Western philosophy, and the world's great wisdom
traditions. Not on the level of details--that is finitely impossible; but on the
level of orienting generalizations: a way to suggest that the world really is one,
undivided, whole, and related to itself in every way: a holistic philosophy for a
holistic Kosmos: a world philosophy, an integral philosophy.
Three years later, Sex, Ecology, Spirituality was the result. During that
period I lived the hermit life; I saw exactly four people in three years (Roger Walsh,
who is an M. D., stopped by once a year to make sure I was alive); it was very much a
typical three-year silent retreat (this period is described in One Taste, June
12 entry). I was locked into this thing, and it would not let go.
The hard part had to do with hierarchies. Granted, rigid social hierarchies are
deplorable, and oppressive social rankings are pernicious. Postmodernism has
fortunately made us all more sensitive to those injustices. But even the
anti-hierarchy critics have their own strong hierarchies (or value rankings). The
postmodernists value pluralism over absolutism--and that is their value hierarchy.
Even the eco-philosophers, who abhor hierarchies that place man on the top of the
evolutionary scale, have their own very strong hierarchy, which is: subatomic elements
are parts of atoms, which are parts of molecules, which are parts of cells, which are
parts of organisms, which are parts of ecosystems, which are parts of the biosphere.
They thus value the biosphere above particular organisms, such as man, and they deplore
man's using the biosphere for his own selfish and ruinous purposes. All of that comes
from their particular value hierarchy.
Feminists have several hierarchies (e.g., partnership societies are better than power
societies; linking is better than ranking; liberation is better than oppression);
systems theorists have hundreds of hierarchies (all natural systems are arranged
hierarchically); biologists and linguists and developmental psychologists all have
hierarchies. Everybody seemed to have some sort of hierarchy, even those who
claimed they didn't. The problem is, none of them matched with the others. None of
the hierarchies seemed to agree with each other. And that was the basic problem that
kept me locked in my room for three years.
At one point, I had over two hundred hierarchies written out on legal pads lying all
over the floor, trying to figure out how to fit them together. There were the
"natural science" hierarchies, which were the easy ones, since everybody
agreed with them: atoms to molecules to cells to organisms, for example. They were
easy to understand because they were so graphic: organisms actually contain cells,
which actually contain molecules, which actually contain atoms. You can even see this
directly with a microscope. That hierarchy is one of actual embrace: cells literally
embrace or enfold molecules.
The other fairly easy series of hierarchies were those discovered by the developmental
psychologists. They all told variations on the cognitive hierarchy that goes from
sensation to perception to impulse to image to symbol to concept to rule. The names
varied, and the schemes were slightly different, but the hierarchical story was the
same--each succeeding stage incorporated its predecessors and then added some new
capacity. This seemed very similar to the natural science hierarchies, except they
still did not match up in any obvious way. Moreover, you can actually see organisms
and cells in the empirical world, but you can't see interior states of consciousness in
the same way. It is not at all obvious how these hierarchies would--or even
could--be related.
And those were the easy ones. There were linguistic hierarchies, contextual
hierarchies, spiritual hierarchies. There were stages of development in phonetics,
stellar systems, cultural worldviews, autopoietic systems, technological modes,
economic structures, phylogenetic unfoldings, superconscious realizations.... And
they simply refused to agree with each other.
G. Spencer Brown, in his remarkable book, Laws of Form, said that new knowledge
comes when you simply bear in mind what you need to know. Keep holding the problem in
mind, and it will yield. The history of human beings is certainly testament to that
fact. An individual runs into a problem, and simply obsesses about that problem until
he or she solves it. And the funny thing is: the problem is always solved.
Sooner or later, it yields. It might take a week, a month, a year, a decade, a
century, or a millenium, but the Kosmos is such that solutions are always forthcoming.
For a million years, men looked at the moon and wanted to walk on it....
I believe any competent person is capable of bearing problems in mind until they yield
their secrets; what not everybody possesses is the requisite will, passion, or insane
obsession that will let them hold the problem long enough or fiercely enough. I, at
any rate, was insane enough for this particular problem, and toward the end of that
three-year period, the whole thing started to become clear to me. It soon became
obvious that the various hierarchies fall into four major classes (what I would call
the four quadrants); that some of the hierarchies are referring to individuals, some to
collectives; some are about exterior realities, some are about interior ones, but they
all fit together seamlessly; the ingredients of these hierarchies are holons,
wholes that are parts of other wholes (e.g., a whole atom is part of a whole molecule,
which is part of a whole cell, which is part of a whole organism, and so on); and
therefore the correct word for hierarchy is actually holarchy. The Kosmos is a
series of nests within nests within nests indefinitely, expressing greater and greater
holistic embrace--holarchies of holons everywhere!--which is why
everybody had their own value holarchy, and why, in the end, all of these
holarchies intermesh and fit perfectly with all the others.
The universe is composed of holons, all the way up, all the way down. And with that,
much of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality began to write itself. The book is divided
into two parts (three actually, counting the endnotes, a separate book in themselves).
Part One describes this holonic Kosmos--nests within nests within nests
indefinitely--and the worldview of universal integralism that can most
authentically express it. This part of the book covers a great deal of ground, and one
of my regrets is that I could not include the voluminous research material and
explanations that would flesh out the details with much more persuasion. As those who
have seen some of the research notes will attest, many of the paragraphs in SES are
summaries of short books. (One reviewer actually spotted this, and began the review,
"No summary of this book is possible. The book, all 524 pages of text and 239
pages notes, is a summary, which should reveal the depth and breadth of its
scope." Other reviewers found this very irritating, but I really had no choice.
I hope to be able to get these research notes into print at some point, not so much to
show the material itself as to make it available for criticism and scrutiny. But that
reviewer is right: SES is a summary.)
If the first part of the book attempts to outline a universal integralism--a view
of the holonic Kosmos from subconscious to self-conscious to superconscious--the
second part of the book attempts to explain why this holistic Kosmos is so often
ignored or denied. If the universe really is a pattern of mutually interrelated
patterns and processes--holarchies of holons--why do so few disciplines
acknowledge this fact (apart from their own narrow specialties)? If the Kosmos is
not holistic, not integral, not holonic--if it is a fragmented and jumbled
affair, with no common contexts or linkings or joinings or communions--then fine,
the world is the jumbled mess the various specialties take it to be. But if the world
is holistic and holonic, then why do not more people see this? And why do many academic
specialties actively deny it? If the world is whole, why do so many people see it as
broken? And why, in a sense, is the world broken, fragmented, alienated,
divided?
The second part of the book therefore looks at that which prevents us from seeing the
holistic Kosmos. It looks at what I call flatland.
(At one point I had named part one and part two, before deciding not to narrow their
content with a name; but part one was "Spirit-in-Action," and part two was "Flatland."
Part two, in any event, attempts to explain why part one isn't more often seen and
understood.)
In going over this book for its inclusion in the Collected Works, I decided to
do a second, revised edition, mostly because I wanted to clarify a few sections in
light of the constructive criticism of the first edition. In particular, I wanted to
explain more clearly the historical rise of scientific materialism (a version of
flatland), and thus I have added several new sections in several chapters (especially
12 and 13), along with six new diagrams, which I believe help the narrative
considerably. I have also carefully gone over the endnotes, including new material
where appropriate.
Speaking of the endnotes, they really were written as a book in themselves. Many of
the most important ideas in SES are mentioned and developed only in the notes (such as
the Basic Moral Intuition), as is much of the dialogue with other scholars (Heidegger,
Foucault, Derrida, Habermas, Parmenides, Fichte, Hegel, Whitehead, Husserl) and with
alternative present-day theorists (Grof, Tarnas, Berman, Spretnak, Roszak). The notes
also contain a handful of polemical bursts, which I will explain in a moment. All of
these have been retouched for the second edition.
Once the book was conceived, the actual writing went fairly quickly. It was published
in 1995 and, I'm told, was the largest selling academic tome in any category for that
year, going into eight printings in as many months. The reactions to it were extreme,
from incredibly positive statements to infuriated rants. But the specific criticisms
were straightforward, and they deserve a respectful hearing.
The Major Criticisms of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality
Some critics of the book claimed that it too rigidly categorized various approaches and
thus marginalized important differences. They therefore charged the book with various
"isms" of one sort or another (sexism, anthropocentrism, speciesism, logocentrism, and
invidious monism). Those defending the book claimed that most of the criticisms came
from individuals whose worldviews were shown to be narrow and partial by comparison,
and they were reacting in a negative fashion for that reason. Both sides refused to
budge, generally.
In my opinion, there are a handful of serious criticisms that need to be addressed.
Although I believe the bulk of these criticisms are based on an unfamiliarity with my
work as a whole, some are more serious. Here are the major criticisms.
Piaget
One of the most common charges was that I used Piaget as the basis for my entire view
of psychological development. This is very inaccurate, but I understand how the book
gave that impression. One of the most difficult problems I face in writing about my
ideas is that I always assume the audience has no prior knowledge of my work. With
each new book I therefore must start from scratch and explain my "system" from the
beginning. Usually, around the first third of a book is taken up introducing the
system, and then the new material is presented in the last part of the book. This
gives readers familiar with my work the impression that I am repeating myself; but this
is for the benefit of those new to the game.
With SES, I did this introducing using a few shortcuts, which was perhaps a bad idea.
For the higher or transpersonal stages of development, instead of explaining the stages
themselves, I simply used examples of each (Emerson, Saint Teresa, Eckhart, and Sri
Ramana Maharshi), and for the ontogenetic development of worldviews, I simply used the
work of Jean Piaget. Many reviewers--especially the postmodern
pluralists--jumped on Piaget as an example of the fact that I was using
old-paradigm, hierarchical, Eurocentric, sexist schemes, and therefore the entire book
was suspect.
Of course, those who were familiar with my work knew that Piaget was only one of dozens
of theorists that I had attempted to integrate into a more holistic overview of
development, and that, even then, I was not a strict Piagetian by any means. But
before I briefly state my view, let us not rush over the attacks on Piaget too quickly,
because the unfairness of those attacks apply equally to those aimed at SES. For the
fact is, if we focus on the aspects of cognition that Piaget studied, his general
scheme has held up to intense crosscultural investigation. Those who attack Piaget
often seem uniformed of the evidence.
After almost three decades of intense crosscultural research, the evidence is virtually
unanimous: Piaget's stages up to formal operational are universal and crosscultural.
As only one example, Lives Across Cultures: Crosscultural Human Development is a
highly respected textbook written from an openly liberal perspective (which is often
suspicious of "universal" stages). The authors (Harry Gardiner, Jay Mutter, and
Corinne Kosmitzki) carefully review the evidence for Piaget's stages of sensorimotor,
preoperational, concrete operational, and formal operational. They found that cultural
settings sometimes alter the rate of development, or an emphasis on
certain aspects of the stages--but not the stages themselves or their crosscultural
validity.
Thus, for sensorimotor: "In fact, the qualitative characteristics of sensorimotor
development remain nearly identical in all infants studied so far, despite vast
differences in their cultural environments." For preoperational and concrete
operational, based on an enormous number of studies, including Nigerians, Zambians,
Iranians, Algerians, Nepalese, Asians, Senegalese, Amazon Indians, and Australian
Aborigines: "What can we conclude from this vast amount of crosscultural data? First,
support for the universality of the structures or operations underlying the
preoperational period is highly convincing. Second,... the qualitative characteristics
of concrete operational development (e.g., stage sequences and reasoning styles)
appear to be universal [although] the rate of cognitive development...is not uniform
but depends on ecocultural factors." Although the authors do not use exactly these
terms, they conclude that the deep features of the stages are universal but the surface
features depend strongly on cultural, environmental, and ecological factors (as I would
put it, all four quadrants are involved in individual development). "Finally, it
appears that although the rate and level of performance at which children move through
Piaget's concrete operational period depend on cultural experience, children in diverse
societies still proceed in the same sequence he predicted."
Fewer individuals in any cultures (Asian, African, American, or otherwise) reach formal
operational cognition, and the reasons given for this vary. It might be that formal
operational is a genuinely higher stage that fewer therefore reach, as I believe. It
might be that formal operational is a genuine capacity but not a genuine stage, as the
authors believe (i.e., only some cultures emphasize formal operational and therefore
teach it). Evidence for the existence of Piaget's formal stage is therefore strong but
not conclusive. Yet this one item is often used to dismiss all of Piaget's
stages, whereas the correct conclusion, backed by enormous evidence, is that all of the
stages up to formal operational have now been adequately demonstrated to be universal
and crosscultural.
I believe the stages at and beyond formop are also universal, including vision-logic
and the general transrational stages, and my various books have presented substantial
evidence for that. But the point is that any model that does not include Piaget's
stages up to formop is an inadequate model.
Waves, Streams, and States
Although I include the Piagetian cognitive line in my model, as demanded by the
crosscultural evidence, his scheme is, as I suggested, only a small part of an overall
view. In my model, there are the various levels or waves of consciousness (stretching
from matter to body to mind to soul to spirit), through which pass various
developmental lines or streams (including cognitive, affective, moral, interpersonal,
spiritual, self-identity, needs, motivations, and so on). A person can be at a very
high level in one line (say, cognitive), at a medium level of development in others
(e.g., emotional intelligence), and at a low level in still others (e.g., morals).
Thus, a person's overall development follows no linear sequence whatsoever.
Development is far from a sequential, ladder-like, clunk-and-grind series of steps, but
rather involves a fluid flowing of many waves and streams in the great River of Life.
Moreover, a person at virtually any wave or stage of development can experience an
altered state of consciousness or a peak experience of any the transpersonal
realms (psychic, subtle, causal, or nondual). Thus, transpersonal peak experiences and
altered states are available to virtually anybody at virtually any stage of
development; the notion that transpersonal states are available only at higher
levels of development is quite incorrect. My overall model, then, consists of waves,
streams, and states, and thus there is precious little about it that is linear.
And yet that was by far the most common criticism of SES: it represented a model of
merely linear development. Since I had not subscribed to a linear model since 1981
(see the Introduction to volume 3 of the Collected Works)--and since, in
fact, I had written at length criticizing such a view (the rejection of which marked
the transition from phase-2 to phase-3 in my own work)--I must confess I was
astonished to see critics ascribe this view to me and then criticize it at length. A
book purporting to be a dialogue with my work contained these or similar errors
throughout, and it has taken several years to dig out from under those unfortunate
distortions. Still, it is finally the case that, due to vigorous support by scholars
of my work, one hears less and less the charge that my model is linear (it is
multidimensional), or that it is Eurocentric (it is based on much crosscultural
evidence), or that it is marginalizing (holarchies transcend and include in multiple
contexts), or that transpersonal experiences occur only at higher levels (they are
available as states at any level).
At the same time, I repeat that I understand how critics could have gotten the
wrong impression if they only read SES. I should have made my overall model much
clearer, which would have helped to ward off these misunderstandings. I have attempted
to do so in the second edition, and, obviously, in this Introduction.
Spirituality in Children and Dawn Humans
Closely related to the previous criticism was the charge that I denied any sort of
spirituality to both children and early humans. This, too, is an unfortunate
misrepresentation of my work, based exactly on the notion my model is merely linear. A
few critics went apoplectic at my "linear" model and accused me of things slightly
worse than well-poisoning. Since my model is one of waves, streams, and
states--and since transpersonal states can occur at virtually any wave of
unfolding--that particular criticism is considerably off the mark. I can, as I
said, understand how a critic who had only read SES might get that impression, but the
impression is false. (For a specific discussion of spirituality in children and in
early humans, see the Introductions to volumes 2 and 3 of the Collected Works,
and especially Integral Psychology, chapters 10, 11, and 12.)
As is perhaps obvious, a good deal of the major criticisms of SES were based on simple
misrepresentations of my work, with blame to be shared on both sides: I did not clearly
outline my overall model, and the critics were not well-informed of all of my other
works. My responses began to sound like a broken record: "That is not my view, that
is not my view, that is not...." Nobody got more tired of this than I.
The Treatment of Eco-Philosophies
One quite accurate criticism was that I lumped together the many various
eco-philosophies and treated them indiscriminately. This is true, and the criticism is
well-taken. In my defense, I can only say that I explained, in several endnotes, that
volume 2 of the Kosmos trilogy (Sex, God, and Gender: The Ecology of Men and
Women) treats the various eco-philosophies separately and deals with each on its
own terms. I was simply stating certain broad conclusions from those studies. At
the same time, SES levels a very powerful critique at many, I would say most, of the
current eco-philosophies, pointing out that they are, in fact, representatives of a
very flatland view. One reviewer of SES concluded that "this presentation, which I
believe is generally true, is fatal to most forms of ecotheory," and Michael Zimmerman
(author of Radical Ecology) pointed out that most (not all) forms of
eco-philosophy do indeed appear to be caught in flatland as described.
SES went on to suggest a type of eco-philosophy that is profoundly ecological but not
in flatland terms, and, in my own opinion, this holonic ecology is one of the
book's most important contributions. However, because SES does not subscribe to the
flatland version of ecology that most (not all) eco-philosophies adopt, SES was not
well-received by eco-philosophers generally. It is still not. And yet, as SES
carefully explains, most eco-philosophies do indeed contain the major problems,
inherent in flatland, that will very likely continue to hobble them (both theoretically
and practically) until a more holonic ecology is embraced.
Emerson and Plotinus
A few neopagan critics objected to my treatment of both Emerson and Plotinus. I made
two minor factual errors in reporting their views. One, I incorrectly used ellipses in
several Emerson quotes. Two, I reported the final words of Plotinus according to the
translation given by Karl Jaspers, not William Inge as indicated. Both errors were
corrected in subsequent printings. But those minor infractions became the starting
point for a neopagan onslaught as to my interpretations of Emerson and Plotinus
altogether. (See One Taste, July 12 entry; and The Eye of Spirit,
chapter 11, endnotes 1, 2, and 3).
Unfortunately, in my opinion, this attack simply allowed some of the eco-philosophers
to draw attention away from my substantial criticisms of their views, and also to
ignore the major criticisms that both Emerson and Plotinus themselves leveled against
nature mysticism (and would therefore level against most forms of present-day
ecopsychology, deep ecology, ecofeminism, and neopaganism).
Here, from The Eye of Spirit, is a summary of the widely accepted interpretation
of Emerson's view: (1) nature is not Spirit but a symbol of Spirit (or a manifestation
of Spirit); (2) sensory awareness in itself does not reveal Spirit but obscures it; (3)
an Ascending (or transcendental) current is required to disclose Spirit; (4) Spirit is
understood only as nature is transcended (i.e., Spirit is immanent in nature, but fully
discloses itself only in a transcendence of nature--in short, Spirit transcends but
includes nature). Those points are uncontested by Emerson scholars.
As far as those points go, Plotinus would have completely agreed. Thus, both Emerson
and Plotinus would condemn--as truebut partial--most (not all)
forms of ecopsychology, Gaia worship, neopaganism, deep ecology, and ecofeminism. This
is why it became important for these particular eco-philosophers to assert that the
common and widely accepted interpretations of Emerson and Plotinus (which I presented)
were in fact massive distortions, because otherwise they could not claim support for
their neopagan theories from these two towering figures (a claim several had already
made). Of course, one is free to try to bring fresh and novel interpretations to the
classics, and the neopagans might be on to some new and wonderful insights about
Emerson and Plotinus, which I fully concede. But to try to get these new
interpretations across by simply asserting that I had massively distorted these
theorists was one of the most ham-handed of the criticisms aimed at SES (not to mention
the fact that, even if it were true, it wouldn't affect the conclusions of SES one way
or the other).
Perhaps I should mention that I have since become friends with one of the neopagans who
was leading the charge of my "dishonesty" and "distortions" of Emerson and Plotinus,
and I believe that we have both come to a mutual appreciation and respect. Neither of
us finds the other dishonest or ill-motivated.
Minor Points
Chapter 2 outlines "twenty tenets" that are common to evolving or growing systems
wherever we find them. Many people counted them up and didn't get twenty, and they
wanted to know if they had missed something. This simply depends on what you count as
a tenet. I give twelve numbered tenets. Number 2 contains four tenets, and number 12
contains five. That's nineteen altogether. Throughout the book, I give three
additions. That's twenty-two. But one or two of the tenets are not really
characteristics, just simple word definitions (e.g., tenet 7 and possibly 9). So that
leaves around twenty actual tenets, or actual characteristics of evolution. But there
is nothing sacred about the number twenty; these are just some of the more noticeable
trends, tropisms, or tendencies of evolution.
Chapter 9, "The Way Up Is the Way Down," discusses evolution and involution. Evolution
is the unfolding from matter to body to mind to soul to spirit, with each higher
dimension transcending and including its juniors, resulting in the Great Nest of Being.
Involution is the reverse process, or the higher dimensions "enfolding" and "involving"
themselves in the lower, depositing themselves in the lower as great potentials, ready
to unfold into actuality with evolution. Some readers felt that this made the universe
completely deterministic and fated. But involution, in my opinion, simply creates a
vast field of potentials, which are not determined as to their surface features at all.
Those are co-created during evolution, depending on an almost infinite number of
variables, from individual initiative to random chance. (I deal specifically with this
topic in the Introduction to volume 2 of the Collected Works and in Integral
Psychology.) Within very broad spaces, evolution is playfully creative at every
point!
A few Jungians wished that I had expanded my discussion of archetypes. Further
material can be found in The Eye of Spirit, chapter 11 (which also answers
common criticisms from Jungians), and Integral Psychology.
One critic wondered why I had relied so much on Habermas for my account of phylogenetic
evolution. Actually, I relied on dozens of major anthropological researchers--many
of which are listed in the bibliography (and hundreds of which are listed in volume 2
of the trilogy)--but because I was using Habermas as an example of a theorist who
recognizes all three domains of art, morals, and science (the "Big Three"), I simply
presented his extensive anthropological research as long as it did not conflict with
generally accepted conclusions in the field.
Smile When You Say That, Mister
There is, finally, the tone of the book. Sex, Ecology, Spirituality is in some
ways an angry book. Anger, or perhaps anguish, it's to hard to say which. After three
years immersed in postmodern cultural studies, where the common tone of discourse is
rancorous, mean-spirited, arrogant, and aggressive; after surveying countless "new
paradigm" treatises, many of which boasted, without irony, that they possessed the new
paradigm that was the greatest transformation in history and that would save the planet
and save the world; after being exposed to a relentless onslaught of anti-Western,
anti-male, anti-culture, anti-almost-anything rhetoric that was some of the most toxic
and venomous writing I have ever seen, and which reduced cultural studies to this or
that pet theory and narcissistic display of self--after all of that, in anger and
anguish, I wrote SES, and the tone of the book indelibly reflects that.
In many cases it is very specific: I often mimicked the tone of the critic I was
criticizing, matching toxic with toxic and snide with snide. Of course, in doing so I
failed to turn the other cheek. But then, there are times to turn the other cheek, and
there are times to not. If you happen to agree with the holistic vision
presented in SES, you, too, might get angry at the narrowness of what passes for
cultural studies nowadays. You might also share a sense of sadness, of melancholy, at
the shallowness that pervades postmodernism. Between anger and anguish you might
oscillate, as did I when writing the book. And, to be honest, I think all of that is
appropriate. But SES definitely was, for me, a cry of anger and anguish.
Still, I could have toned the book down. I chose not to. I sincerely believed, as I
still do, that the occasional polemical burst was necessary to get the conversation
moving in an integral direction. For over two decades I had seen numerous excellent
books with an integral intent completely ignored by "new paradigm" theorists who
claimed to be integral and holistic. I chose to rattle the cage and see what happened.
Did it work? What was its effect? Several critics took the polemic to be evidence of
my nasty character: I just couldn't help myself, I had to attack. This overlooked the
fact that in all of my first twelve books, stretching over two decades, there is not a
single polemical sentence.
Other critics maintained that the tone prevented its message from getting out. I truly
understand what they mean, but I claim exactly the contrary. These ideas had been
studiously ignored for decades, until a little polemical rattling, whereupon they took
center stage, for better or worse.
One critic inadvertently demonstrated what was involved by calling for a "dialogue" in
the wake of SES, wherein all parties would care for each other in a dance of mutual
respect, and not conduct theoretical discourse as if it were a war. This critic then
proceeded to do exactly what he professed he despised, and instead of presenting both
sides of the argument fairly and respectfully, simply condemned my tone from start to
finish.
The fact is, the pro and con stances on the tone of the book lined up almost exactly
with whether or not one agreed with it. Those who agreed with the holistic vision of
SES shared my anger and anguish, and applauded the polemic. As one critic put it, "Let
us not forget: many of us really liked the polemical notes in SES, for their refreshing
critiques and liberating humor."
On the other side of the aisle, those who were themselves criticized in the book, or
found the vision deficient, lashed out at the tone. As one put it, "Worse than
ignorant, Wilber is also unmannered, rude, and offensive."
No doubt, both sides were right.
The Kosmos Trilogy
But by far the most common overall reaction to SES was one of what I suppose we might
call joy. I was flooded with mail from readers who told of the liberating influence
that SES had on their view of the world, on their view of reality, on their
consciousness itself. SES is, after all, a story of the feats of your very own Self,
and many readers rejoiced at that remembrance. Women forgave me any patriarchal
obnoxiousness, men told me of weeping throughout the last chapter. Apart from
Grace and Grit, I have never received such heartfelt and deeply moving letters
as I received from SES, letters that made those difficult three years seem more than
worth it.
I am often asked when volume 2 will be published. My original plan was to release one
volume a decade, which means volume 2 would be ready around the year 2005. But now I
have no idea exactly when the other two volumes will be ready. Volume 2 is more or
less fully written. Volume 3 exists in outline. But I want each to have the chance to
absorb the constructive criticisms of its predecessor. In the previous section on
Objections, I only focused on the major criticisms, each of which, in my opinion, can
be satisfactorily answered. What I didn't mention are all the dozens of minor
criticisms that I found valid and well-taken, and which I have attempted to incorporate
in subsequent writing. I would like the Kosmos trilogy to stand as a solid version of
a truly integral philosophy, a believable if initial world philosophy, and thus I
would like all the many cogent criticisms to have plenty of time to sink in.
There is one other reason I am in no rush to bring out the other volumes. SES itself
was begun in part due to a lament at the state of postmodern cultural studies. In the
time since SES was conceived--a period in which postmodernism was just beginning to
wane--its stance has weakened even more perceptibly. We are truly entering a
post-postmodern, post-pluralistic world--by any other name, integral.
Genuinely integral philosophies will become, and are becoming, more and more
acceptable, even eagerly embraced. With every passing year, there is one less chapter
of criticism I have to write. With every passing year, a universal integralism becomes
more and more welcome.
One critic wrote of SES that "it honors and incorporates more truth than any approach
in history." I obviously would like to believe that is the case, but I also know that
every tomorrow brings new truths, opens new vistas, and creates the demand for even
more encompassing views. SES is simply the latest in a long line of holistic visions,
and will itself pass into a greater tomorrow where it is merely a footnote to more
glorious views.
In the meantime, it is quite a ride.
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