Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Chapter 10

1. p. 361: "Philosophers such as Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas... have all given devastating criticisms of the self-contradictory stance of pluralistic relativism, contextualism, and constructivism."

     Kim's margin notes: "For the central performative contradiction inhabiting postmodernism, see Karl-Otto Apel, Selected Essays; Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity; John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality; Thomas Nagel, The Last Word; Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self."

2. p. 362: "Just as significant is the review of Nagel's book by Colin McGinn carried in The New Republic."

     Kim's margin notes: "'Reason the Need,' Colin McGinn, The New Republic, Aug. 4, 1997."

3. p. 363: "McGinn then drives to Nagel's inescapable conclusion: 'But this... subjectivism is refuted.'"

     "My own view," Powell continued (from Kim's notes), "and those of many of my colleagues, is that there are universal deep features with relative surface features--what we have, throughout this seminar, also called universal pluralism, integral-aperspectival, worldcentric compassion, universal integralism, integral pluralism, and so on (all of which mean pluralism set in a universal context, or aperspectivism set in an integral space). For example, the normal human body universally contains two kidneys, one heart, ten fingers. No postmodernist has believably demonstrated otherwise. But what one does with one's fingers is not universal at all: whether you use them to play baseball or plant rice is determined by local, individual, cultural contexts.

      "In making the culturally relative surface features the entire story, extreme postmodernism (and boomeritis) has devastated human and spiritual understanding, which often includes a universal/transcendental component. 'The case that Nagel presents should disturb all those who have been lulled, or bludgeoned, into the flabby relativism that is so rampant in contemporary intellectual culture. Richard Rorty comes in for some stern critical words from Nagel, and they are richly deserved.'"

4. p. 365: "It has become increasingly obvious that extreme postmodernism. pluralism, and relativism are the grand refuge of boomeritis."

     Lesa Powell continued (from Kim's notes):

      "The standard response of pluralists, when faced with the performative contradiction, is to claim that pluralism is a self-contradiction only if pluralists are implicitly assumed to be pursuing a universal agenda (so that you can in fact have a noncontradictory pluralism). But if that is the case, and pluralists are not in fact arguing for a universal validity to their claims, then those claims are not binding on me or on you, and thus we can ignore them. Their claims have no validity, by their own tortured account.

      "Another common ploy by pluralists is to claim that discourse can have aims other than truth or falsity--such as expression, understanding, playfulness, and 'concourse.' But, of course, that is a trivial point fully conceded by worldcentric philosophers. The point at issue, rather, is that part of discourse known as truth, which pluralists must either address or ignore. When they address the issue, they invariably claim that they are making statements that are true for all cultures--for example, it is true for all cultures that reality is not pregiven but is socially constructed, that knowledge is interpretive and not merely representational, and that values are not eternal Platonic archetypes but culturally and intersubjectively molded. The postmodernist does NOT claim that those statements are merely his interpretations that are not necessarily true for other humans in different cultural contexts; no, he claims that they are true for all humans everywhere.

      "In other words, those are all strong universal claims: the postmodernist is claiming that all cultures are subject to certain context-transcending truths. The postmodernist makes dozens of claims that he or she insists are true and binding on all humans everywhere, such as the contextuality of all knowledge, the interpretive component of all experience, the relativistic aspect of perspectives, the pluralistic nature of values, the multiple loci of participatory events, and the historicity of all truth. Since all of those are context-transcending claims made by those who insist that there are no context-transcending claims, then all of those involve deeply embedded self-contradictions in the ways that Nagel, McGinn, Habermas, Searle, and Taylor (among others) have demonstrated.

      "At this point, clever pluralists, realizing that their stance simply will not work, retreat to theories about meta-language. There is literally no other course of action open to them, and they know it. Thomas McCarthy, answering David Hoy's attempt to do so, has spelled out in detail the insuperable difficulties of such a move. The question is whether we can do without universal or 'context-transcending' truth claims. David Hoy--arguably Hans-Georg Gadamer's ablest interpreter in America and a staunch defender of pluralism--realizes that he himself is definitely making universal or context-transcending claims. He at least does not try to deny it, as most pluralists do, making him one of the few honest pluralists on the planet. Rather, he moves to meta-language in order to stake his claim, as McCarthy describes and summarily refutes:

     Does Hoy think we can do without theoretical, context-transcending truth claims altogether? Not entirely. He acknowledges the 'paradoxical' nature of the 'metatheoretical' claims that make up the core of his [pluralistic position], for they are themselves context-transcending claims about the nature of truth, meaning, interpretation, historicity, and the like. That paradox is typical of contextualist arguments generally. Hoy handles the appearance of contradiction by distinguishing metatheories from first-order theories or interpretations. While the former may properly claim context-transcending validity, the latter may not. But this claim itself depends on his metatheory being the right one, and thus is not the end but the beginning of disagreement. Moreover, the considerations that Hoy advances in defense of his metatheory look suspiciously like substantive claims about language, interpretation, and so forth. That should come as no surprise, for there is a long history of failed attempts to distinguish 'meta' from 'object' languages. What we in fact have are two competing, substantive accounts of certain aspects of sociocultural life, each claiming to be not just 'true for us' but 'true, period.' And if those substantive claims can legitimately aspire to context-transcending validity, there is no obvious reason why others may not as well. Nor is Hoy's metatheory neutral with respect to 'first-order' interpretations. It implies, for instance, that any interpretation which fails to recognize the variability of forms or life or the interpretational nature of worldviews and self-understanding is inadequate, for it conflicts with central insights of the (one right) metatheory. (Hoy and McCarthy, Critical Theory, p. 240)

      "In short, McCarthy concludes, 'the postmodernist thinkers invariably suppose much of what they are denying'--that is, they do themselves exactly what they condemn in others. They then further claim a moral superiority for this hypocrisy. What we are suggesting is that boomeritis offers the actual structure for that duplicity: preformal narcissism hiding out in postformal pluralism allows the ego to blame others for that which it is doing itself in a largely unconscious or unacknowledged fashion.

     "(See Sidebar F: 'Participatory Samsara,' for an extensive discussion of what appears to be this deeply hidden self-deception.)

      "I am not saying all pluralists have boomeritis. My simple point is that boomeritis has given to pluralistic relativism a widespread popularity and an emotional charge all out of proportion to its actual merit, and made it all but impossible for its believers to move to second-tier integral constructions.

      "An alternative to embracing either universalism or contextualism--by enacting a dynamic, dialectical, integrative dance--is given by the author of Sex, Ecology, Spirituality, who is a colleague of mine and a member of IC. SES suggests three basic 'views' or 'truths' that need to be acknowledged. One is that of Emptiness, or radically unqualifiable openness; and then, in the manifest realm, those truths that are universal or worldcentric and those that are local, particular, and contextual. (Actually, there is a spectrum of perspectives from the local to the universal: those that are purely individual, those that are shared by a group, shared by many groups, shared by a culture, shared by many cultures, shared by all cultures--but 'local' and 'universal' are the general end points. See Integral Psychology for a discussion of this idea).

     "All three of those--Emptiness, universal, particular--are an important part of an integral-aperspectival view. And note that Emptiness itself is neither universal nor particular, neither absolute nor relative, neither infinite nor finite, neither universal nor contextual, for it is radically unqualifiable and not captured by any opposites and dualities (including that one). Thus, in no case does SES present a foundationalism or an 'absolutism.'

      "What most pluralists do not acknowledge is how much local and relative knowledge the universal and worldcentric philosophers allow: the staggering preponderance of occasions are local and plural. Even Habermas, as McCarthy points out, 'has consistently restricted the focus of his analysis... to questions of truth and justice. He does not claim, and in fact explicitly denies, that suppositions of like universality attach to critique or textual interpretation, or to discussions of ethics, politics, identity, and the good life. In such matters, differences in context and perspective do influence the form and substance of deliberation...' (p. 238). The point, again, is that certain features are context-transcending and universal, but most particular matters are not--and any theory that tries to deny either of those is almost certainly an inadequate theory.

     "A common pluralist retort is that they do believe in universals, but those universals are dialectically at play with all particulars, where 'dialectic' as actually used simply denies universals qua universals and thus continues the pluralist's greatest of dreams: smashing anything universal other than his own values, which are--or he believes should be--true for all cultures.

      "Just as SUNY Press is the purveyor of much of extreme postmodernism in this country, Blackwell is in Britain. So it is fascinating to see that its most recent A Dictionary of Cultural and Critical Theory, which one would expect to be chock full of postmodern poststructuralist tenets, in fact contains a Nagel-like attack on most postmodern theories of constructivism and relativism. 'Therefore it follows, supposedly, that all truth talk, whether in the natural or more theory-prone human sciences, comes down to a choice of the right sort of metaphor (or the optimum rhetorical strategy) for conjuring assent from others engaged in the same communal enterprise. Scientists have understandably considered this an implausible account of how advances come about through the joint application of theory and empirical research. Hence the recent emergence of causal-realist or anti-conventionalist [universal and anti-subjectivist] approaches which offer a far better understanding of our knowledge of the growth of knowledge. After all, there seems rather little to be said for a philosophy of science that effectively leaves itself nothing to explain by reducing "science" to just another species of preferential language game, rhetoric, discourse, conceptual scheme, or whatever. The current revival of realist ontologies betokens a break with this whole misdirected--as it now appears--line of thought.'

      "The conclusion of all of this is that a heavy or even extreme emphasis on participatory pluralism is one of the major forms of green-meme expression in this generation--and therefore participatory pluralism is one of the main hideouts of boomeritis. This theme is explored at length in Sidebar F: 'Participatory Samsara'--The Green Meme's Approach to the Mystery of the Divine.'"

5. p. 371: "Along with universally attacking universals... the archetypal boomeritis stance is an extremely aggressive attack on hierarchy, carried out in a hierarchical fashion."

     Jefferson continued (from Kim's notes): "As with most of the intellectual accoutrements of boomeritis, this anti-hierarchy stance stems from the worldview of pluralistic relativism and the green meme: having heroically differentiated numerous systems, contexts, and lifeworlds--and after having recognized that each system must be understood in its own historical context--the green meme fails to grow yet further and recognize that the various pluralistic contexts themselves exist in deeper and wider contexts that unfold across both space and time--a realization that, of course, would usher in second-tier consciousness, dynamic dialecticism, integral pluralism or universal integralism--call it what you will. This why we heard Don Beck say that green often ends up doing more harm than good. (See Integral Psychology for a discussion of these topics.)"

6. p. 381/82: "If you'd like to pursue this important topic, we will hand out a list of books that will get you started on ways to, shall we say, deconstruct the mean green meme and the damage it has done."

     Here is the handout Carlton gave of some recommended reading, which she also read aloud:

      "For an exposé of the boomeritis art establishment, an establishment that pretty much controls art and art museums in this country, see Exhibitionism: Art in an Era of Intolerance, by Lynne Munson.

      "For the unfortunate effects of boomeritis on medicine, see PC, M.D., by Sally Satel, M.D.

      "For the nightmares that boomeritis has inflicted on the law, see Beyond All Reason: The Radical Assault on Truth in American Law, by respected law professors Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry.

      "As for the sad, even tragic effect of boomeritis on race relations, you might start with Losing the Race: Self-Sabotage in Black America, by John McWhorter, a black linguistics professor at Berkeley. This is a particularly brilliant book that exposes the myth that 'white racism is the main obstacle to black success and achievement.' The real obstacle, McWhorter points out, is an interlocking set of three mentalities: anti-intellectualism, separatism as a coping strategy, and the cult of victimology (all ornaments, we note, of the MGM).

      "As only a few examples of what boomeritis anthropology has done to the past, see The Culture Cult: Designer Tribalism and Other Essays, by Roger Sandall, which documents how 'the romantic insistence on the superiority of the primitive is increasingly grounded in a fictionalized picture of the past.' See also The Killing of History, by Keith Windschuttle, and particularly Sick Societies: Challenging the Myth of Primitive Harmony, by Robert Edgerton.

      "For various types of criticism of boomeritis feminism--which is virtually the only type of feminism now in existence with any influence (it controls academic and political feminists)--see Daphne Patai and Noretta Koertge, Professing Feminism: Cautionary Tales from the Strange World of Women's Studies; Nancy Etcoff, Survival of the Prettiest: The Science of Beauty; Nadine Strossen (president of the American Civil Liberties Union), Defending Pornography: Free Speech, Sex, and the Fight for Women's Rights; Who Stole Feminism?: How Women Have Betrayed Women and The War Against Boys: How Misguided Feminism is Harming Our Young Men, by Christina Hoff Sommers; and Rene Denfeld's superb The New Victorians: A Young Woman's Challenge to the Old Feminist Order.

      "For the catastrophic effects of boomeritis on academia and the political process, see Jonathan Rauch, Kindly Inquisitors: The New Attacks on Free Thought; Todd Gitlin, The Twilight of Common Dreams: Why America Is Wracked by Culture Wars; Richard Bernstein, Dictatorship of Virtue: Multiculturalism and the Battle for America's Future; Charles Kors and Harvey Silverglate, The Shadow University: The Betrayal of Liberty on America's Campuses.

      "And remember, the fact that few of those books are integral or second-tier--they are often blue or orange--does not detract in the least from their true points; but we at Integral Center are placing those important if limited criticisms into a distinctively second-tier approach, as indicated throughout this lecture series. Second-tier criticisms of the mean green meme can be found, for example, in Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor, John Searle, Don Beck, Bob Richards, Sean Hargens, Scott Warren, Petra Pieterse, Andre Marquis, Maureen Silos, Frank Visser, Bert Parlee, Karl Otto-Apel, Michael Zimmerman, Keith Thompson, Fred Kofman, Jenny Wade, Karin Swann, Mark Palmer, Luc Ferry, Alain Renaut, among increasingly numerous others."